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I. CONCERNS ABOUT LOBBYING
Widespread concerns' about the influence of lobbyists have been
addressed only half-heartedly through legal regulation. At the federal, 2
state, 3 and local4 levels of American government, numerous rules have
I See, e.g., Editorial, Lobby Reform Lite, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A20 ("[An] easy
money, quid pro quo culture ... now bedevils the Capitol.... [L]egislators shameless[ly] use
•.. executive jets ... eagerly offered by corporate officials bent on insider access.... [Tihe
people's representatives blatantly designate lobbyists to head their fund-raising teams."). Dis-
turbing reports about the influence of lobbyists are common. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews,
Vague Law and Hard Lobbying Add Up to Billions for Big Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at
AI (explaining how lobbyists turned a "supposedly cost-free incentive ... [into a] multibil-
lion-dollar break for an industry making record profits").
2 See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-12 (West 2005); see also
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 692 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter GUIDE TO
CONGRESS] ("The first comprehensive lobbying law was enacted in 1946, and ... there have
been other piecemeal changes since then .... "); id. at 716-23 (discussing the history of
federal lobbying regulations). See generally William H. Minor & Karen A. Regan, Federal, in
LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 STATE HANDBOOK §§ 10.1-10.42 (Peter C.
Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (summarizing federal lobbying laws); KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER,
THE LOBBYISTS: THE ART AND BUSINESS OF INFLUENCING LAWMAKERS (1951) (explaining
why the Lobbying Act of 1946 "was so long in coming... [and] how it was finally passed").
3 Lobbying "has always existed in state legislatures, often more corruptly and brazenly
than in Washington." SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 260. By 1951, "thirty-eight states and
Alaska regulate[d] lobbies by law other than those laws forbidding bribery." Id. Today, every
"state in the union ... has enacted legislation regulating the conduct of those who 'lobby' the
state's legislative or executive officials." Florida League of Prof'I Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87
F.3d 457, 458 (11 th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted). Many states have requirements similar to
the federal lobbyist registration requirements, and "the trend at both the national and state
levels is for greater disclosure and tighter oversight of lobbying activities." William P. Horn,
Introduction to the Legislative Process, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FOR
PRoFITs 51 (Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001). "State lobby laws generally apply to the state
legislature, the executive branch (including state agencies), or both." Chip Nielsen et al., State
Lobby and Gift Laws, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2005: COMPLYING WITH CAM-
PAIGN FINANCING, LOBBYING & ETHICS LAWS 663 (Jan Witold Baran, et al. eds., 2005) (em-
phasis omitted). See generally LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: 50 STATE
HANDBOOK (Peter C. Christianson et al. eds., 2003) (setting forth, state-by-state, registration
rules, reporting requirements, and prohibited activities).
4 Some states, such as Georgia, Minnesota and New York, "regulate and require state-
wide reporting of attempts to influence action by local legislative bodies (such as city councils)
and administrative agencies." Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665. Most states, however, leave
local lobby regulation to local governments." Id. at 663. Furthermore, "{m]any major munici-
pal and regional governments separately regulate lobbying." Id. at 665. For examples of codes
in major cities that specifically regulate lobbyists, see AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE §§ 4-
8-1 to -11 (2006), available at http://www.amlegal.com (follow "library" hyperlink; then fol-
low "Texas" hyperlink; then follow "Austin(Code)" hyperlink; then follow "Frames" hyper-
link; then follow "Chapter 4. Business Regulation and Permit Requirements" hyperlink; then
follow "4-8" hyperlink); DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS §§ 12A-I to -43 (2006), available at
http://www.amlegal.com (follow "library" hyperlink; then follow "Texas" hyperlink; then fol-
low "Dallas" hyperlink; then follow "Frames" hyperlink; then expand "More" folder; then
follow "Chapter 12A" hyperlink); MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI,
§§ 2-651 to -658 (2006), available at http://www.municode.com (follow "Online Library"
hyperlink; then follow "Florida" hyperlink; then follow "Miami" hyperlink; then follow
"Miami Code of Ordinances" hyperlink; then expand "Chapter 2 ADMINISTRATION"
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been adopted to govern the conduct of lobbyists. Yet, many of those laws
are so weak 5 or incomplete 6 that they do little to advance the cause of
good government. 7 Even the reforms recently passed by Congress 8 are
said by lobbyists to contain "ample loopholes for those seeking to buy
access to lawmakers, mainly through campaign fund-raising."9
Citizens following media reports might easily conclude that the situ-
ation is hopeless. 10 However, this unfortunate state of affairs reflects a
folder; then expand "Article VI. LOBBYISTS" folder); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS
OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§ 2-62 to -71 (2006), available at http://www.sanantonio.gov/
atty/Ethics/codetext.htm (setting forth a detailed regime of lobbyist prohibitions and disclosure
requirements); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE
§§ 2.100 to 2.160 (2006), available at http://www.municode.com (follow "Online Library"
hyperlink; then follow "California" hyperlink; then follow "San Francisco" hyperlink; then
follow "San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code" hyperlink); SAN JOSE,
CAL., SAN Jost MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.12.010 to .12.550 (2006), available at http://
www.amlegal.com (follow "library" hyperlink; then follow "California" hyperlink; then fol-
low "San Jose" hyperlink; then follow "Frames" hyperlink; then expand "Title 12. ETHICS
PROVISIONS" folder).
5 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(4)-(5) (LexisNexis 2002) (identifying
"practices which reflect discredit on the practice of lobbying or on the Legislature" as Class III
misdemeanors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-302 (2005) ("No lobbyist or principal shall engage
in or directly or indirectly authorize any unprofessional conduct.").
6 See, e.g., Kathryn L. Plemmons, "Lobbying Activities" and Presidential Pardons:
Will Legislators' Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-lined Jurisprudence?,
18 B.Y.U . J. PUB. L. 131, 131-32 (2003) ( "[T]he lobbying that results in ... presidential
pardons slips below the media's radar primarily because of a controversial loophole in the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995... [T]he LDA does not require that contributions to presi-
dential libraries be disclosed.").
7 Cf Leah Rush & David Jimenez, States Outpace Congress in Upgrading Lobbying
Laws: 24 States Have Made Disclosure Strides Since 2003, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=781 ("A Center for
Public Integrity survey that evaluated the strength of lobbying disclosure laws nationwide
found the federal law to be weaker than those of 47 of the 50 states.").
8 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Passes Vast Overhaul in Ethics Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2007, at Al (discussing reforms).
9 David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat as House Cranks Up Ethics Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at Al 3 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat]. See also David D.
Kirkpatrick, Congress Finds Ways to Avoid Lobbyist Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at Al
(discussing arrangements to circumvent new lobbyist restrictions, including one where a
"$2,500 contribution from a lobbyist's political action committee entitles the company's lob-
byist to join ... [a Congressman] at a Starbucks near his Capitol Hill office four times").
10 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Bill Puts Campaign Gifts in the Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at Al (reporting that the Senate passed a bill that would require lobbyists
to disclose "the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars they raise from clients and friends and
deliver as sheaves of checks" to members of Congress, "a tradition known as bundling," but
that House passage of the measure is "far from assured"). Cf. Editorial, Ethics Reform Mea-
sures Littered with Loopholes, SAN ANTONIO ExPmss-NEws, May 25, 2006, at 6B ("Give
federal lawmakers a bill, a policy or an edict, and they will find a loophole to circumvent it.");
Editorial, The Lobbyist Empowerment Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A22 (criticizing a
proposed reform as an "Orwellian shell of righteous platitudes about transparency and
integrity").
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lack of political will 11-and the powerful influence of lobbyists I2-more
than uncertainty as to what should be done. There are valuable legal
steps that can and should be taken to minimize the risks that lobbying
will corrupt the exercise of governmental power. As this article demon-
strates, for virtually every problem that one can identify relating to lob-
byists, some legislative body, somewhere in the country, has already
found a plausible solution.
It is important to remember that regulating lobbyists is a continuing
task that faces every generation. Even when reforms are passed, they are
often eroded by legal changes subsequently made to "loosen" the rules
when public attention is focused elsewhere. For example, the ban on gifts
recently enacted by the U.S. House of Representatives 13 is reminiscent of
reforms passed in the mid-1990s, which substantially tightened the rules
on gifts, but were relaxed after just four years in force. 14 Regulation of
lobbyists is a never ending task, just as ethics in government is a goal
never permanently achieved.
Any effort to regulate lobbyists must begin by placing their conduct
in context. It is essential to understand both the surrogate role that lobby-
ists play in communicating with public representatives, as well as the
constitutional principles that bear upon that endeavor. Only when both
that functional role and those constitutional principles are taken into ac-
count is it possible to craft a legal regime to effectively minimize the risk
that lobbying will distort official decision-making.
11 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Push to Tighten Lobbying Rules Loses Strength, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2006, at Al (reporting that "the drive for a tighter lobbying law ... is losing momen-
tum"). Cf Editorial, Razzle-Dazzle 'Em Ethics Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A16
(opining that congressional "lawmakers, globe-trotting at the giddy rate of $10 million a year
in free private excursions.... killed . . .[a proposed ban on privately funded travel] and
substituted cosmetic panaceas for their promised ethics reform").
12 See Editorial, Full Disclosure of Back-Scratching, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007 (reporting
that "K Street lobbyists" and others have stalled efforts to force disclosure of "the huge sums
in campaign donations that lobbyists package to grease privileged access in the Capitol," a
practice known as "bundling"); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbyists Foresee Business As Usual:
Post-Abramoff Rules Expected to Be Merely a Nuisance, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2006, at AI
[hereinafter Birnbaum, Lobbyists] ("An estimated $10 billion is spent annually to influence
legislation and regulations."); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 716 ("[T]he relative ab-
sence of limitations on lobbying is [due in part to] .. .the lobbies' consolidated and highly
effective opposition to more regulation."); James A. Thurber, From Campaigning to Lobbying,
in SHADES OF GRAY: PERSPECTIVES ON CAMPAIGN ETHICS 152 (Candice J. Nelson et al. eds.,
2002) ("15,000 full-time lobbyists [are] registered by Congress representing virtually every
type of interest in America .... [And] there are thousands more individuals lobbying state
legislatures, city councils and executive branches at every level of American government.").
13 See discussion infra subpart III.A.2.
14 See Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, Gifts and Travel, available at http://
www.house.gov/ethics/Gifts andTravelChapter.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); see also,
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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The debate over the conduct of lobbyists is often so complex,
politicized, and confused as to leave those who might lead or support
reform efforts bewildered and hopeless. This Article addresses those
problems by describing clear points of reference for evaluating existing
rules and improving the standards of conduct governing lobbyists. Part II
of this Article examines the American practice of citizen participation in
government, including: the constitutionally protected right to petition the
government (subpart II.A); the role of lobbyists as citizen surrogates
(subpart II.B); the historical lineage of lobbying (subpart II.C); the perils
that can arise from improper lobbying practices (subpart II.D); and the
goals that should animate lobbyist restrictions (subpart II.E). Part III dis-
cusses the prohibitions (subpart III.A) and disclosure requirements (sub-
part III.B) that can be employed to regulate lobbying activities. Part III
also addresses the definitional and drafting problems inherent in any at-
tempt to expose to public scrutiny information about well-funded lobby-
ing that takes place "behind closed doors." Finally, Part IV offers a brief
assessment of which types of lobbyist regulations are the most effective
in terms of furthering the interests of good government.
II. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT
A. RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
In the American democracy, citizens play a vital role in govern-
ment by providing public officials and employees with requests for
action, information, and perspectives relating to the issues of the
day.' 5 The right to petition the government has long been recognized
in Anglo-American law. 16 Enshrined in the United States Constitu-
15 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137
(1961) ("In a representative democracy... [the executive and legislative] branches of govern-
ment act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representa-
tion depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives.").
16 Indeed, the right to petition was recognized before American independence. See, for
example, McDonald v. Smith, where the Supreme Court stated:
The historical roots of the Petition Clause long antedate the Constitution. In 1689,
the Bill of Rights exacted of William and Mary stated: "[I]t is the Right of the
Subjects to petition the King." . . . This idea reappeared in the Colonies when the
Stamp Act Congress of 1765 included a right to petition the King and Parliament in
its Declaration of Rights and Grievances.... And the Declarations of Rights enacted
by many state conventions contained a right to petition for redress of grievances.
472 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1985) (quoting I Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2) (citation omitted). See
also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667,
685-711 (2003) (tracing the right to petition as far back as the Magna Carta and providing a
detailed review of the right to petition in the colonies and early American republic). Of
course, citizen involvement in lawmaking is not unique to the Anglo-American legal tradition.
See generally Vincent Robert Johnson, The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizens of 1789, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT'L
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tion 17 and many state constitutions,' 8 the right to petition is an "impor-
tant aspect of self-government,"t 9 which is "recognized ... as one of 'the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.'- 20 In-
deed, the Supreme Court has said on multiple occasions that the right to
petition "is implied by the very idea of a government, republican in
form."' 2 1
The right to petition is set against a backdrop of other important
constitutional guarantees, which, like the Petition Clause, are rooted in
the First Amendment. Freedom of association 22 allows persons to join
together in groups to form and express their views.2 3 Likewise, freedom
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 35-36 & n.8 (1990) (discussing Article VI of the French Declaration,
which recognized that persons have the right to participate in the formation of laws). The
Declaration of the Rights of Man was greatly influenced by provisions in early American state
constitutions, which Benjamin Franklin was instrumental in distributing in France while he
was an ambassador in Paris from 1776 to 1784. Id. at 9-10 (citing J. MOORE, THE ROOTS OF
FRENCH REPUBLICANISM 67-68 (1934)). See also Sue Bentch, Confidentiality, Corporate
Counsel, and Competition Law: Representing Multi-National Corporations in the European
Union, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1003, 1010 (2004) (referring to "intense lobbying" in Europe).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."). See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963) ("First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from
invasion by the States."); Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The "Difficult Constitutional
Question" of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1299,
1302 (2003) ("In the context of petitions to the legislative or executive branches of govern-
ment, the Supreme Court has held that the right does not include a duty of response by those
branches and does not include the right to file sham or maliciously false petitions.") (citing
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484, Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282, 285
(1984), and E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 127)); Wishnie, supra note 16, at 668
& n.4 ("Oral as well as written communications are protected as petitioning activity.").
18 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("[Pleople have the right ... to make known their
opinions to their representatives and to apply for redress of grievances."); MASS. CONST. Pt. 1,
art. 19 ("The people have a right ... to request of the legislative body, by the way of ad-
dresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances
they suffer."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 20 (2006) ("The citizens have a right... to apply to those
invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by
petition, address or remonstrance.").
19 McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483.
20 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (quoting Mine Workers v.
Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
21 Id. at 524-25 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)) (internal
punctuation omitted).
22 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[I]mplicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Our form of
government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association .... Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally
been through the media of political associations.").
23 See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622 ("An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to
petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those
[Vol. 16:1
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of speech 24 and freedom of the press 25 broadly promote free expression
by shielding those who speak or write on subjects of public concern from
civil 26 or criminal27 liability.
In considering the demands that the First Amendment imposes on
legal regulations, Justice Brennan famously observed that there is "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. ' 28 This commitment
to vigorous public debate is reflected in many arenas, ranging from the
protection of academic freedom 29 to the passage of anti-SLAPP 30 stat-
utes in twenty-two states.31 Anti-SLAPP statutes make it easier for courts
to dismiss defamation suits and other 32 retaliatory claims filed against
persons who speak out on public issues. 33
ends were not also guaranteed."); NAACP v. Button, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("[It] is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that, in a
defamation suit by a private person suing with respect to a matter of public concern, a state
may "not impose liability without fault" as to the falsity of the statement).
27 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (reversing a criminal defama-
tion conviction because "even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitu-
tion which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences
to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood").
28 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
29 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("The essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our
youth."); see also Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
plaintiffs academic freedom was not violated where he failed to allege that he was "restricted
from or sanctioned for speaking publicly about an issue"); Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672
F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]o prevail over academic freedom the interests of govern-
ment must be strong and the extent of intrusion carefully limited.").
30 SLAPP is an acronym for a strategic lawsuit against public participation. "In general
terms, a SLAPP suit is 'a meritless suit filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First
Amendment rights."' Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830,
834 (Cal. App. 1996) (citing Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (1994)).
31 Stephen L. Kling, Missouri's New Anti-SLAPP Law, 61 J. Mo. B. 124, 125 (2005)
("Twenty-two states have adopted anti-SLAPP legislation to further protect citizens in exercis-
ing their rights of free speech and to petition government as guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment."). See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-9
(West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.635-.670 (2005).
32 See Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. Nat'l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, 698
N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that an action for tortious interference with business
relationships amounted to a SLAPP, in violation of statute).
33 The core provisions of these laws are: (i) establishment of a process for motions
to dismiss or strike claims targeting public participation; (ii) expediting the hearing
of such motions and suspending or sharply limiting discovery until a ruling is made;
and (iii) shifting the attorneys' fees and costs to the filer when the target prevails on
the motion.
2006]
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America's commitment to the open debate of public issues logically
extends beyond discussions among the citizenry to include communica-
tions between citizens and public officials or employees. The interests of
democracy cannot be served by requiring those who petition the govern-
ment to do so with trepidation or excessive caution about what they say
or how frequently they express their views. The right to petition, along
with the related rights of association, speech, and press, 34 must be inter-
preted 35 in a manner that invites vigorous, 36 and sometimes controver-
sial,3 7 discussion of public affairs. 38
B. PETITIONING THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SURROGATES
In some instances, it is necessary or appropriate for persons seeking
to petition the government to channel their efforts through volunteer or
paid intermediaries. Such representatives, at least when they are paid, are
Kling, supra note 31, at 125 (citing Lori Potter, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
tion and Petition Clause Immunity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10852, 10856 (July 2001)).
34 Wishnie, supra note 16, at 719 ("The modem Supreme Court has generally regarded
the right to petition as subsumed within the more familiar rights of speech and association, and
the Court's extensive speech jurisprudence thus supplies a useful reference for examining the
Petition Clause...").
35 Id. at 715 ("Few litigants have pressed claims under the Petition Clause, and few
courts have engaged in significant analysis of the scope or content of the rights it protects.").
36 Cf. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (holding that a publicity campaign by railroads directed toward obtaining governmental
action adverse to the interests of trucking companies was not illegal even though it may have
been affected by an anticompetitive purpose). In E. R.R. Presidents Conference, Justice Black
wrote:
To hold . . . that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative
history of that Act... [Sluch a construction... would raise important constitutional
questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade
these freedoms.
id. at 137-38.
37 See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) ("[T]he First Amendment, which pro-
tects a controversial as well as a conventional dialogue ... extends to petitions for redress of
grievances ... as well as to advocacy and debate.").
38 Cf Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
fight to petition for the redress of grievances has an ancient history and is not limited to
writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before
the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor."). However, the
mere fact that legal regulations may place some burden on the exercise of the right to petition
does not mean that the regulations are unconstitutional. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
828 n.6 (1974) ("[T]he alternative means of communication with the press that are available to
prisoners, together with the substantial access to prisons that California accords the press and
other members of the public satisfies whatever right the inmates may have to petition the
government through the press."). In Pell, the inmates had argued that a regulation which pre-
cluded face-to-face interviews with the media was unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights to petition the government. Id. at 817.
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often called lobbyists. 39 Though widely vilified,40 lobbyists representing
individuals or groups can make a valuable contribution to informed and
effective government. Lobbyists can direct ideas and opinions to appro-
priate decision makers and clearly express the views of citizens who
have too little time or skill to do so personally. 4' Lobbyists also illumi-
nate the practical consequences of proposed government conduct 42 by
ensuring that the insights and professional expertise of a particular busi-
ness or industry become part of the deliberative process.43
Lobbying, as an exercise of the right to petition, is not necessarily
evil.44 In addition to the interests of the business community, lobbyists
routinely advance the interests of nonprofit institutions45 and public in-
39 William Safire traces the political use of the term "lobbyist" to the mid-seventeenth
century, when citizens would use a large anteroom, or lobby, near the English House of Com-
mons to plead their cause to members of Parliament"). GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at
691 (citing WILLIAM SAFIRE, WILLIAM SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 383 (1980)). In
America, "[t]he first recorded use of the word, according to H.L. Mencken, was in 1829, the
year in which Andrew Jackson became President. It originally appeared as 'lobby-agent' and
was applied to seekers after special privilege at the Capitol in Albany... From the beginning it
was a term of reproach..." SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 5.
40 "For most Americans the words 'Washington lobbyist' have roughly the same cachet
as, say, 'deadbeat dad."' Meredith A. Capps, Note, "Gouging the Government": Why a Fed-
eral Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition Is Consistent with First Amendment Freedoms, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2005) (quoting David Segal, Main Street America Has Advocates
Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All, WASH. POST, July 10, 1995, at A1). See generally
JEFFREY M. BERRY WITH DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS 48-49 (2003) (discuss-
ing lobbying as a "dirty word"); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 (discussing the
"pejorative connotation" of lobbying).
41 See generally John Chwat, The Use of Outside Legislative Consultants: When and
How to Hire a Lobbyist, in THE LEGISLATIVE LABYRINTH: A MAP FOR NOT-FOR-PROFITS 111
(Walter P. Pidgeon, Jr., ed., 2001) (discussing the skills of effective lobbyists).
42 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 691 ("[Ilt is in large part through lobbying
that government gets its information.").
43 See Gary Scharrer, Lobbying Didn't Let Up When the CHIP was Down, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEws, Apr. 14, 2006, at 1A (quoting the executive director of the Center for Public
Policy Priorities, a group that tracks issues affecting low- and middle-income Texans, as stat-
ing that "[Hobbyists bring expertise about how the real world works.... You couldn't do
without the lobby"); see also BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J. LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS:
How THE SYSTEM WORKS 50 (2d ed. 1996) (opining that lobbyists "who can volunteer sub-
stantive assistance-legislative proposals, speeches, floor statements, drafts of op-ed articles-
are cultivated" by legislators); Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting a Washington
lawyer as stating that at the federal level "legislation and regulations are so complex that the
need for professional lobbyists will not diminish").
44 See generally GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 700-15 (discussing lobbying by
business groups, labor, environmentalists, farmers, public-interest groups, civil-rights groups,
education groups, churches, and others).
45 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 111 ("[H]iring an outside legislative consultant or lobby-
ist is a widely accepted practice by trade and professional associations, corporations, unions,
and not-for-profit organizations."). See generally BERRY, supra note 40, at 25-31 (discussing
nonprofit organizations as lobbies).
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terest groups. 46 Some of the most vulnerable segments of society, includ-
ing young children,47 the elderly,48 and laborers, 49 have benefited from
lobbying. Indeed, even cities and other local government entities hire
lobbyists to advocate their interests in state legislatures 50 or before the
federal government. 51
From a business standpoint, hiring a lobbyist is often the smart thing
to do. According to some experts, "[s]uccess in the legislative labyrinth
is . . . directly proportional to hiring the right" lobbyists or legislative
consultants. 52 Viewed systemically, "[tihe relationship between special
interests, acting through lobbyists, and legislators is central to under-
standing much of the legislative process. 5 3
C. HISTORICAL LINEAGE
The roots of lobbying in the United States reach back to the early
days of the republic. According to one source, when the Adamses from
the Bay Colony trekked to the "first Continental Congress as representa-
tives of the restless New Englanders . . . they were met by a group of
lobbyists, sent to... steer the[m] ... away from any dangerous ideas of
independence they might be prepared to press." '54
All through the sessions of the Congress lobbying went
on in full force .... The hogsheads of Madeira and port
that were dispensed and the huge dinners of mutton and
46 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3 (discussing public-interest groups); see also
Women's Caucus Converges on Washington to Lobby Congress, TRIAL, June 2005, at 10
(describing lobbying efforts by women trial lawyers "to tell lawmakers how proposed medical
malpractice legislation would hurt women, children, senior citizens, and all consumers").
47 Mary Gereau, one of the first women lobbyists in Washington, D.C., actively pro-
moted the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Head Start Act. See Yvonne Shinhoster
Lamb, Mary Gereau, 89; Lobbyist on Education, ERA, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at B6.
48 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 694 (discussing lobbying by the AARP).
49 "Much of the Great Society legislation of the 1960s, under President Lyndon B. John-
son, was the product of lobbying by organized labor." GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at
702. See also WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 3-4 (discussing labor unions); Sanford
Nowlin, Swarming Capitol Paid Off for SBC, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at
IA (discussing lobbying by the Communications Workers of America union).
50 See Greg Jefferson, San Antonio Gears Up to Draw on Its "Hired Guns" at Legisla-
ture, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Apr. 13, 2006, at 8A (discussing six lobbyists hired for a
total cost of $575,700); see also Nowlin, supra note 49, at IA (stating that the Texas Munici-
pal League lobbies on behalf of cities).
51 See Jodi Rudoren & Aron Pilhofer, Hiring Lobbyists for Federal Aid, Towns Learn
That Money Talks, N.Y. TiMES, July 2, 2006, at 1 ("Cities and towns-and school districts and
transit authorities and utility agencies-across the country are increasingly ... putting lobby-
ists on retainer to leverage local tax dollars into federal tax dollars.").
52 Chwat, supra note 41, at 112.
53 Fred S. McChesney, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND PO-
LITICAL EXTORTION 46 (1997).
54 SCHRIFTGIESSER, supra note 2, at 4.
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pork, duck and turkey ...were not offered without a
purpose. The merchants, the landowners, the Quakers,
the followers of the powerful John Dickinson, used all
the wiles of wealth and social prestige to prevent the del-
egates from the other colonies from insisting upon any
drastic action that might endanger the colonial way of
life.55
The taverns that served the stage coaches running to the nation's
capital also became places where "men and even women 'lobbied' for
different causes or needs" 56 in a "very informal, unorganized and sponta-
neous" manner.57 "Alexander Hamilton's Philadelphia Society for the
Promotion of National Industry, [was the first formal] business lobby
formed for the purpose of influencing legislatures on behalf of a power-
ful faction." 58 The later success of the Boston Manufacturing Company's
lobbying effort, which persuaded Congress to enact the first protective
tariff in 1816, emboldened other manufacturers to send lobbying agents
to the capital. 59
In earlier eras, government ethics rules were even weaker than they
are today. In the 1830's, outside interests could and did hire sitting mem-
bers of Congress to represent them. "Thus, when President Andrew Jack-
son was battling with the Bank of the United States, Sen. Daniel Webster
of Massachusetts was one of the bank's biggest defenders. '60 Decades
later, "[a] lobby headed by Thomas A. Scott, President of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad, and Iowa congressman Grenville M. Dodge ... con-
vinced southern congressmen that the only way the Texas & Pacific
Railway would be built from East Texas to the Pacific coast depended
upon a Republican victory" 6 1 in the disputed presidential election of
1876.62
55 Id.
56 Robert V. Remini, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 38
(2006).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 6. But see 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, Lobbyists, in THE SENATE, 1789-1989: AD-
DRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 491, 492 (1988) ("William Hull was
hired by the Virginia veterans of the Continental army to lobby for additional compensation
for their war services. In 1792, Hull wrote to other veterans' groups, recommending that they
have their 'agent or agents' cooperate with him during the next session to pass a compensation
bill. In 1795, a Philadelphia newspaper described the way lobbyists waited outside Congress
Hall to 'give a hint to a Member, teaze [sic] or advise as may best suit."').
59 See REMINI, supra note 56, at 102 (discussing the tariff and lobbying).
60 Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692.
61 REMINI, supra note 56, at 216.
62 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION
OF 1876 (2004).
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D. THE DARK SIDE OF LOBBYING
Despite lobbying's ancient lineage and constitutional pedigree, past
experience shows that some types of lobbying can have detrimental ef-
fects on the performance of official duties and thereby erode public con-
fidence in government. During the Civil War, for example, "[lobbyists
were increasingly employed to serve the interests of ... entrepreneurs
and found many congressmen of both parties only too happy to cooperate
in 'sweetheart arrangements' for a financial consideration... Bribes and
secret deals were not uncommon, and conflict of interest was rampant.
63
Although modem practices are more subtle, lobbying continues to pose
threats to the proper operation of government. This is particularly true in
cases where lobbyists distort relevant facts, produce decisions based on
favoritism rather than the merits, 64 or give some segments of the commu-
nity a real or perceived unfair advantage in securing access to members
of government.
Lobbying activities that occur outside the scrutiny of neutral third
parties are of particular concern, 65 for, as a general matter, bad practices
thrive in contexts where there are reduced risks of detection and expo-
sure.66 For example, when dubious Congressional "earmarking" 67 prac-
tices are coupled with lobbying, "dollars are doled out, often in secret, at
the whim of a lone legislator-often under the influence of a lobbyist-
rather than through a competitive process."'6 8 There is also widespread
63 REMINI, supra note 56, at 183.
64 Cf id. at 241 (arguing that the railroads' powerful lawyers and lobbyists all but ren-
dered the Interstate Commerce Commission "virtually powerless" in the late 1800s).
65 See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874) (invalidating a contingent-fee agreement to
lobby Congress, the Supreme Court observed that "[n]ot unfrequently [sic] the facts are whis-
pered to those whose duty it is to investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of the
measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, all is well. If he uses
nefarious means with success, the spring-head and the stream of legislation are polluted"). Cf
Thurber, supra note 12, at 152 (opining that "the lack of transparency in the relationship
between elected officials and campaign consultant-lobbyists" poses "a problem for
democracy").
66 Similar issues are raised by in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers under circum-
stances screened from the watchful eye of third parties. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (addressing the effect of in-person solicitation, the Court observed,
"there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervi-
sory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual"). See also Vincent R. Johnson,
Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and
Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 28-29 & n.92 (1988) (discussing solicitation
issues).
67 Earmarking is "a budgetary process used by members of Congress to send federal
dollars to favored projects." Adam Nagourney, House at Stake, Midterm Election Gets Early
Start, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at Al, 2006. Sometimes it involves "lucrative favors that
lawmakers secretly cram into spending bills at the behest of deep-pocketed contractors." Edi-
torial, The Million-Dollar House on the Hill, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2006, at A12.
68 An examination of one lobbying firm showed that "$9.8 million in lobbying fees
translated into $173 million in earmarks, or a return of $18.41 on every dollar spent." Rudoren
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apprehension about lobbying by former public servants who, after enter-
ing the private sector, exploit connections to those still in power. 69 The
same is true of lobbying that involves the expenditure of large amounts
of money.70 Each of these practices create the risk that other members of
the community will not fairly be heard by the persons elected, appointed,
or employed to act on behalf of the government. Left unchecked, perni-
cious lobbying practices threaten public confidence in government and,
as a result, the legitimacy of government itself.7'
Regulation of such lobbying practices is necessary in order to ade-
quately address these risks. However, ethical or legal restrictions on lob-
byists must neither intrude upon constitutional rights, nor impede
unnecessarily the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 72 debate of public
issues.
E. THE GOALS OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS
Lobbying regulations are not meant to discourage persons from ex-
ercising their right to petition the government, nor to harass those who
take advantage of that right. Rather, carefully crafted lobbyist rules
should address five concerns of great importance to democratic institu-
tions. The rules governing lobbyists should ensure (1) that all persons
have a fair opportunity to be heard by the government, (2) that govern-
ment enjoys the confidence of the people, (3) that official decisions are
based on accurate information, (4) that the citizenry knows how the gov-
& Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 16. See also Editorial, Lobbyists, Yes. The People, Maybe., N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2006 ("The news that the Washington lobbying industry is rapidly extending
its tentacles into cities, towns and school districts across the country should be an outright
embarrassment to Congress [because] [ellected lawmakers-not high-paid lobbyists-are sup-
posed to be best attuned to meeting the needs of their localities.").
69 See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level, 36 SErON HALL. L.
REV. 715, 744 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Ethics in Government] ("Citizens are often deeply
cynical when former city officials and employees represent private interests in dealings with
the city government. The citizens suspect, sometimes rightly, that the former city officials and
employees are trading on their connections with those still in government service, and that the
private interests they represent will have an unfair advantage in achieving the results they
seek.") (citations omitted).
70 See Lisa Sandberg & Kelly Guckian, Lobbyists' Money Talks-Softly, But It's Heard,
SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEws, Apr. 12, 2006, at IA (stating that Texas' "best-paid lobbyist
says it would be naive to suggest that big bucks aren't effective. . . 'There isn't a level playing
field.' "). Cf Editorial, Still a Bad Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006 [hereinafter Still a Bad
Deal] (stating that "with so much pro-India lobbying money sloshing around" on Capitol Hill,
there is little hope that Congress will effectively address a bad nuclear cooperation deal with
India).
71 Cf Archibald Cox, Ethics in Government: The Cornerstone of Public Trust, 94 W.
VA. L. REV. 281, 288 (1991-92) ("The public will not give the necessary trust to those who
present government as the place where one feathers his own nest, exchanges favors with
friends and former associates, and takes good care of those who will reward them.").
72 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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emnment operates, and (5) that the performance of public business bene-
fits from the wisdom of the community.
The first objective is sometimes referred to as the "level-playing-
field" concern. 73 America has long been deeply committed to this princi-
ple.74 The right to a level playing field is sometimes called equal protec-
tion of the laws, as set down by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Equal Protection Clause is the basis of the
important rules that prevent invidious discrimination in education, hiring,
and public accommodations or that hold that jobs in the public sector
should be awarded on the basis of qualifications rather than as a form of
patronage. 76 The root idea is that in pursuing desirable things in life, each
person should have a chance to compete on equal terms-or as Abraham
Lincoln said, a "fair chance in the race of life."' 77 In the lobbying context,
practices that improperly give some persons advantages over others
(such as gifts to public officials) run afoul of the "level-playing-field"
principle.
The second objective in regulating lobbyists is to preserve public
confidence in political institutions by ensuring that they are fair not only
in operation, but also in appearance. 78 In other words, it is necessary to
avoid the "appearance of corruption. '79 Perceived corruption, like cor-
ruption itself, can destroy a democratic institution. 80 Thus, lobbyist rules
73 See Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 717, 725-33 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, America's Preoccupation] (discussing
rules applicable to judges, lawyers, and public servants that seek to ensure a level playing field
in public life).
74 See id. at 735-45 (arguing that the search for social equality was a dominant theme in
twentieth century America).
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
76 See Gretchen Reuthling, Chicago Officials Convicted in Patronage Arrangement,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A14 (describing a successful criminal prosecution based on ac-
tions that "violated a 30-year-old federal court order, the Shakman decree, that prohibits politi-
cal considerations in hiring and promotions for about 37,000 city jobs").
77 Lincoln described the Northern cause in the Civil War as saving a form of government
"whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men - to lift artificial weights from all
shoulders-to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all-to afford all, an unfettered start, and
a fair chance in the race of life." 4 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress, in IV COL-
LECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN 438 (Roy Basler ed. 1953).
78 Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(3) (West 2005) ("[T]he ef-
fective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence
Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public confidence in the
integrity of Government.").
79 Cf. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) (recognizing
"the Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion" in the context of campaign contribution restrictions).
80 Cf. TOM WICKER, THE NIXON YEARS, 1969-1974: WHITE HOUSE TO WATERGATE
184-85 (1999) (discussing President Nixon's declaration, "I am not a crook," and subsequent
resignation). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about Martin T. Manton, a distinguished Second
Circuit judge who accepted bribes during the 1930s depression and then defended himself
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should restrict practices that create an appearance of impropriety, such as
business transactions between legislators and lobbyists, 8 1 the presence of
lobbyists on the floor of the House or Senate, 82 or service by a lobbyist
as the treasurer for a legislator's re-election campaign.83
The third goal of lobbyist rules is to guarantee that public decisions
are based upon accurate information. In this, as in other contexts, the law
"presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues," 84 than from a single voice. To avoid misunder-
standings, the First Amendment favors the dissemination of more infor-
mation, not less.85 Consequently, government ethics rules should not
only ban culpable falsehoods by lobbyists, but also seek to move the
debate of public issues into public view, 86 where arguments can be con-
sidered, contested, and judged on their merits. In addition, through dis-
closure requirements, ethics rules should assist public representatives in
scrutinizing the petitioners who come before them. As Chief Justice Earl
Warren remarked:
[L]egislative complexities are such that individual mem-
bers of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myr-
iad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet
full realization of the American ideal of government by
elected representatives depends to no small extent on
their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Other-
against criminal charges by claiming that he had only sought bribes from parties "in whose
favor he had already decided to rule on the basis of the law." WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW
JOHNSON 123 (1992). Because the appellate court sat in panels and other judges testified that
Manton's "conduct in conference had in no way reflected bias," it may have been true that
none of the bribes had played a pivotal role in the resolution of cases. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
BRIBES 569 (1984). Nevertheless, it was necessary for Manton to step down because his con-
duct created a grave appearance of impropriety that impaired public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice. Id. The same analysis would apply to a judge who takes bribes from both
parties and then claims to be uninfluenced. See id. (discussing the fall of Lord Chancellor
Francis Bacon in the 1600s).
81 See discussion infra subpart III.A.6.
82 See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-7-5-4 (LexisNexis 2002) ("No past member of the
general assembly who is a lobbyist may be on the floor of either house while that house is in
session."); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811 (10) (West 2004) ("A... lobbyist shall not go upon
the floor of either house. . . except upon invitation of that house."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6B-
3-8 (LexisNexis 2003) (including the foyer of either house).
83 See infra notes 177-87, 284-301 and accompanying text.
84 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
85 Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (stating that with respect
to potentially misleading lawyer advertising, "the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather
than less").
86 Cf. John M. Black, Silicosis Still a Problem, TEX. LAW., Nov. 25, 2002, at 35 (discuss-
ing a "lobbying effort [that] led to countless unnecessary exposures to a known hazard in
Texas petrochemical plants"), available at 11/25/2002 TEXLAW 35 (Westlaw).
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wise the voice of the people may all too easily be
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seek-
ing favored treatment while masquerading as proponents
of the public weal. 87
The fourth goal in regulating lobbyists is to ensure that people have
access to accurate information about how the government operates. 88
This knowledge is an essential component of representative govern-
ment.89 Otherwise, the citizenry cannot accurately evaluate the perform-
ance of their representatives or cast ballots at the voting booth reflecting
that assessment. 90 In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, "the public has
an interest in knowing who is influencing or attempting to influence their
public officers, for what purpose, the means adopted to that purpose, and
the results achieved." 9' These concerns animate the lobbyist registration
and reporting requirements that have been adopted at the federal, state,
and local levels. 92
Finally, as a fifth objective, lobbyist rules should not impede lobby-
ists and their clients from contributing to the effective resolution of pub-
lic issues. Because the American public is often reluctant to provide
funding for the staffing and expertise needed by legislative bodies, ad-
ministrative agencies, and other organs of government, 93 official decision
87 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (holding that the disclosure require-
ments of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which "wants only to know who is being
hired, who is putting up the money, and how much," did not violate the First Amendment
freedoms "to speak, publish, and petition the Government").
88 ACLU of N.J. v. N.J. Election Law Enf. Comm'n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (D. N.J.
1981) (recognizing that regulation of lobbying serves the state's "strong interest in promoting
openness in the system by which its laws are created"). "Disenchantment ... with the political
process today stems from a lack of knowledge of its details... " Id. (quoting THE ELECTION
LAW REV'N COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO P.L. 1964,
c. 29; P.L. 1965, c. 73; P.L. 1969, c. 192; P.L. 1970, c. 42 at 2 (1970).
89 Cf. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1601(1) (West 2005)
("[R]esponsible representative Government requires public" awareness of the efforts of paid
lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process.").
90 See ACLU of N.J., 509 F. Supp. at 1129 (recognizing that "regulation of lobbying
serves the needs of the electorate" by enabling the "voting public ... to evaluate the perform-
ance of their elected officials").
91 Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (J. Skelly Wright,
concurring).
92 See discussion infra subpart HI.B.
93 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of
Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 1026, 1048-51 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson, Liberating Pro-
gress] (discussing the budgetary limitations of administrative agencies and arguing that
"[h]istory demonstrates that they are frequently underfunded and lack the personnel and other
resources that are needed"); Editorial, Voters Should Pass Prop. 81, Measure A, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), May 14, 2006, at F4 (criticizing inadequate funding for
libraries); Editorial, For Oregon Schools, Let the Round-Up Begin, OREGONIAN (Portland,
Or.), Feb. 15, 2006, at C8 (noting that "[d]uring the past five years, a majority of states have
been sued about inadequate school funding"); Editorial, Local Help for Indigent Mentally Ill is
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makers frequently operate with minimal support. Indeed, "[c]ongres-
sional staffs rarely have the resources to gather their own data and exam-
ples."'94 Such obstacles are also present at the state and local levels. Lob-
byists who provide clear arguments and accurate information to public
servants can play an important role in closing the gap between needs and
resources. 95 Consequently, the rules governing lobbyists should not im-
pede those practices that assist the government in doing its work.
Regulating lobbyists involves essentially the same challenges at the
federal, state, and local levels of government. In each venue, the objec-
tive is to ensure that lobbying does not deprive other persons of the
chance to be heard, diminish confidence in government, distort through
falsehood the exercise of governmental power, or deprive voters and of-
ficials of relevant information. The smaller size of local governments
may dictate a more streamlined regulatory regime than might be appro-
priate at the state capitol or in Washington, D.C. However, throughout
the American democracy, the obstacles created by pernicious lobbying
practices are basically the same.
III. THE LEGAL TOOLS FOR REGULATING LOBBYISTS
The legal tools for regulating lobbyists come in two basic varieties:
prohibitions and disclosure requirements. Legal prohibitions identify
practices that are impermissible, either on all occasions or beyond speci-
fied limits. Such rules may be used to prohibit false statements, 96 limit
gifts to public officials or employees, 97 restrict the scope or frequency of
revolving-door employment, 98 or bar lobbyists from collecting contin-
gent fees99 or exacting economic reprisals against legislators.t°0
Disclosure requirements, in contrast, do not ban particular practices.
Rather, they expose information to community scrutiny by making data
available to the public.10' For example, disclosure regimes typically seek
Hard to Find, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at 12A (discussing inadequate funding for
care of the mentally ill).
94 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697.
95 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Cf. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, I I
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 227 (1995) (contending that "lobbyists can facilitate Congress's over-
sight role . . . [by] reduc[ing] informational asymmetries between Congress and the
bureaucracy").
96 See discussion infra subpart III.A. 1.
97 See discussion infra subpart M.A.2.
98 See discussion infra subpart III.A.4.
99 See discussion infra subpart III.A.5.
100 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6621(b)(5) (2006) (providing that a lobbyist shall
not "[e]xercise any economic reprisal, extortion, or unlawful retaliation upon any legislator by
reason of such legislator's position with respect to, or his vote upon, any pending or proposed
legislation").
101 Cf. THE BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, THE BGA INTEGRITY INDEX 17 (2002),
http://www.bettergov.org/pdfs/Integritylndex-10.22.02.pdf ("[Rlequiring disclosure [of cam-
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to reveal whom a lobbyist represents and how much money the lobby-
ist's client is spending to influence a decision on a particular issue. While
conceptually appealing, disclosure requirements are hard to implement
because it is difficult to determine what information should be reported,
who should be required to report, and how that information can be made
available to the public in a timely fashion. As a result, some disclosure
schemes are exceedingly complex and, as a result, lack the ethical clarity
and efficacy that simpler rules might provide. 102
A. PROHIBITIONS
1. False Statements
False statements of fact can distort the decision-making process.
This is as true in politics as it is in business. In the commercial context,
numerous rules protect consumers and entities from the harm that errone-
ous information can cause. Tort actions for fraud 03 and negligent mis-
representation, t°4 along with statutory claims for deceptive trade
practices, 0 5 exist in virtually all jurisdictions. However, there is an im-
portant distinction between political speech and commercial speech. The
latter is afforded less protection by the Constitution 106 and is therefore
more susceptible to legal regulation. 0 7 With respect to political speech,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the "erroneous statement is inevi-
paign contributions] where they are allowed will prevent certain abuses of authority, particu-
larly with regards to undue influence by lobbyists.").
102 Cf. Mark Davies, Governmental Ethics Laws: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y. L. ScH. L.
REV. 177, 178 (1995) (opining that "whenever possible, ethics codes should contain bright-line
rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook-that is, on the one hand this, on ... the
other hand that, and on the third hand something else"); Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and
Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 25, 41 (2000)
[hereinafter Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes] (recommending that "[a]t a minimum, an
ethics rule should be understandable, memorable, predictable, and capable of efficient enforce-
ment," and stating that rules which are "[i]ntricately drafted, finely nuanced, and exhaustive
... [may] generate uncertainty in the minds of those seeking to follow or apply them").
103 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (discussing liability for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation); see also Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovom, Misrepresentation
by Lawyers about Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 557 (2005)("A cause of
action for fraud protects the plaintiffs decision-making process from being infected by false,
misleading, or incomplete information.").
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (discussing liability for negligent
misrepresentation).
105 "[Elvery state in the union has passed some form of legislation aimed at protecting
consumers from sales abuses." DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 3:1
(2005).
106 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) ("[The Constitution] accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
107 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that
commercial speech enjoys "'a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of
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table in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to sur-
vive." ' 10 8 Thus, civil or criminal liability is not typically imposed (on
lobbyists or others) for false statements related to matters of public con-
cern absent proof of "actual malice." Actual malice requires evidence
that the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless dis-
regard for the truth. 10 9
Liability for deception further requires a provably false assertion of
fact. 10 A pure statement of opinion that does not imply false facts does
not give rise to liability."I' Presumably, these constitutional principles
apply just as readily to lobbyist regulations as in other areas of the
law.' 12 For example, a lobbyist's deliberate misrepresentation of product
test results might give rise to legal sanctions, since test results are a mat-
ter of fact. However, a lobbyist's views about whether a proposed law
would be beneficial to consumers would be beyond legal reproach, if
such statements were purely opinion.
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists are an im-
portant tool for preventing abuse. The Code of Ethics of the American
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression"' (quoting
Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
1o8 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-79 (1964). Addressing the
rule of defamation law which held that truth was a defense, Justice Brennan wrote:
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.... Under such a rule, would-
be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so .... The
rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 279.
109 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (holding that the Petition Clause
did not provide absolute immunity to defendants charged with expressing libelous and damag-
ing falsehoods in petitions to government officials, but that state law only allowed for damages
for defamation if the defendant acted with "knowledge ... that the words are false, or ...
without probable cause or without checking for truth by the means at hand"); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("[Clonstitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.").
110 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that an obscene parody
could not support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless the publica-
tion contained a false statement of fact).
I I I See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding that a statement in a
newspaper column alleging that the petitioner lied at a hearing was "sufficiently factual to be
susceptible of being proved true or false" in a defamation action).
112 Cf Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1607(a)(3) (West 2005) (provid-
ing that the act shall not "be construed to prohibit or interfere with ... the right to express a
personal opinion").
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League of Lobbyists supports the view that honesty and integrity"13 are
essential aspects of effective lobbying.' 14 Thus, provisions at the state" 5
and local 16 levels which bar false statements by lobbyists stand on solid
ground in terms of ethical and business principles. However, if such legal
rules do not expressly include a culpability requirement,' 17 presumably
they must be applied in a manner that is consistent with the First Amend-
ment and the actual malice standard. This is important, for it is often
difficult to establish actual malice."18 Even so, prohibitions against false
statements by lobbyists are an important tool for preventing abuse. First,
a ban on misrepresentations by lobbyists is an essential symbol, without
which the moral force of a law purporting to regulate lobbyists is seri-
ously undercut. Second, such restrictions are readily understood by the
public, urged by reformers, and invoked by government "watchdogs."
Third, the nature of modern communication sometimes makes it possible
to prove actual malice. Lobbyists often rely on extensive written material
113 AMERICAN LEAGUE OF LOBBYISTS' CODE OF ETHICS §§ 1.1-9.2, http://www.alldc.org/
ethicscode.htm. Article I of the code provides:
A lobbyist should conduct lobbying activities with honesty and integrity.
1.1. A lobbyist should be truthful in communicating with public officials and with
other interested persons and should seek to provide factually correct, current and
accurate information.
1.2. If a lobbyist determines that the lobbyist has provided a public official or other
interested person with factually inaccurate information of a significant, relevant, and
material nature, the lobbyist should promptly provide the factually accurate informa-
tion to the interested person.
1.3. If a material change in factual information that the lobbyist provided previously
to a public official causes the information to become inaccurate and the lobbyist
knows the public official may still be relying upon the information, the lobbyist
should provide accurate and updated information to the public official.
Id. at art. I.
114 See WOLFE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 13 (discussing why not telling the truth "will
come home to haunt the lobbyist and harm his or her prospects on this and other issues").
115 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(3) (2004) (barring intentional deception). See
generally Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667 ("[Mlany states prohibit lobbyists from 'deceiv-
ing' officials with regard to material facts or information pertinent to pending action.").
116 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-67(a)
(2006) ("A person who lobbies or engages another person to lobby, or any other person acting
on behalf of such persons, shall not intentionally or knowingly make any false or misleading
statement of fact to any city official, or, knowing a document to contain a false statement,
cause a copy of such document to be received by a city official without notifying such official
in writing of the truth."); see also id. at § 2-67(b) ("A registrant who learns that a statement
contained in a registration form or activity report filed by the registrant during the past three
(3) years is false shall not fail to correct that statement by written notification to the City Clerk
within thirty days of learning of the falsehood.").
117 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 86205(b) (West 2005) (stating that no lobbyist or
lobbying firm shall "[d]eceive or attempt to deceive any elected state officer, legislative offi-
cial, agency official, or state candidate with regard to any material fact pertinent to any pend-
ing or proposed legislative or administrative action").
118 See generally Vincent R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW
991-95 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing proof of actual malice in defamation litigation).
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to make the case for their clients.' 19 Electronic messages, including
email, 120 and surreptitious recordings can often be used to prove what
was said and to scrutinize those statements. 12' Consequently, there may
be sufficient evidence for a factfinder to determine whether misrepresen-
tations of fact were culpably false.
One type of falsehood that commonly arises in the government con-
text is the creation of a false appearance of public approval for a particu-
lar government action. This manufacturing of an artificial substitute for
authentic grassroots support is sometimes referred to as "astroturfing."122
Such misrepresentations by lobbyists are banned in some states' 23 and
cities. For example, a San Antonio ordinance provides that "[a] person
who lobbies ... shall not cause any communication to be sent to a city
official in the name of any fictitious person or in the name of any real
person, except with the consent of such real person."'124
Prohibitions against false statements of fact by lobbyists can be en-
forced by civil 125 and criminal sanctions, 126 such as fines and mandatory
119 See GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 696 (quoting a legislative aide as stating that
"there's a new breed of lobbyist around. There's less of the slap-on-the-back ... approach.
Now it's 'Here's a twenty-page paper full of technical slides, charts,..., a table . . . .and
some language in case you'd like to introduce an amendment."'). But see Barry M. Aarons, So
You Want to be a Lobbyist?, ARIZ. AT-r'v, Dec. 1998, at 26 (quoting a veteran state lobbyist as
saying, "You won't ever use ... mounds of paper at the legislature... [Ihf you can't put it on
one sheet of paper, it is useless"), available at 35-DEC Ariz. Att'y 26 (Westlaw).
120 Cf. Pete Yost, Bush Official is Tied to Guilty Lobbyist: Procurement Chief Accused of
Hiding Abramoffs Moves, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 25, 2006, at 9A (discussing a
criminal prosecution where "hundreds of e-mails" between a White House procurement officer
and a lobbyist were "the focal point of the case"); Thomas B. Edsall, E-mails Detail Dealings
ofSafavian, Abramhoff, WASH. POST', Apr. 15, 2006, at A5 (indicating that e-mail documented
"a collapse of traditional borders separating lobbyists seeking favored treatment and govern-
ment officials, including members of Congress").
121 Cf. Court Filing: Lawmaker Taped Taking $100,000: U.S. Rep. Jefferson's Comments
Reportedly Recorded by FBI Informant, Assoc. PRESS, May 21, 2006 (discussing a Louisiana
congressman whose conversations were recorded), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/12903856/?GTI=8199.
122 See Greg Aljer & Jessica Burnette-Lemon, Ethics in the Real World, COMM. WORLD,
Mar. 1, 2006 (discussing "astroturfing" in the lobbying context), available at 2006 WLNR
3967436 (Westlaw).
123 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(5) (2004) (barring communication with legis-
lators under fictitious or assumed names); see also Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667 (indicat-
ing that some states prohibit lobbyists from "creating the false appearance of public support for
an action").
124 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-67(e)
(2006).
125 See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f) (discussing civil sanctions). See also Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West 2005) (providing for enforcement of lobbyist disclosure
requirements by a civil fine of not more than $50,000).
126 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-87(g) (discussing crimi-
nal sanctions).
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bans on all lobbying activities for a period of years. ' 27 Some regulations
also prohibit any person (including a public official or employee) from
"intentionally or knowingly ... aid[ing] or assist[ing] another person to
engage in conduct violative of the obligations imposed by" the laws ap-
plicable to lobbyists.' 28 If the false statement is contained in a sworn
filing, such as the registration statements 29 or periodic activity reports 130
many lobbyists must file, that document can serve as the basis for a per-
jury prosecution.13' In addition, if the false statement is part of a public
filing, some laws treat each day during which the false statement is not
corrected as a new violation subject to an additional fine.' 32
2. Gifts, Meals, Entertainment, and Travel
When lobbyists bestow gifts upon public servants, there is both an
actual risk and an appearance of impropriety. The risk is that the lobby-
ist's client will enjoy an unfair advantage because the offering will in-
duce the official or employee to make a decision calculated to repay the
favor, rather than based on the merits. 133 Even if the recipient has not
been influenced by the gift, the public will perceive that the lobbyist's
client enjoys an unfair advantage vis a vis others. 134 Consequently, the
127 See, e.g., id. at § 2-87(f)(3)(a) (contemplating a sanction whereby the violator is "pro-
hibited from lobbying on behalf of clients before the city for a period not to exceed three (3)
years"); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-607(b)-(c) (2004) (prohibiting purposeful falsehood
by lobbyists, enforceable by a three-year ban from acting as a registered lobbyist).
128 CODE OF ETHics OF THE CrrY OF SAN ANTONIO §2-72.
129 Id. at § 2-65 (discussing registration of lobbyists).
130 Id. at § 2-66 (discussing quarterly activity reports).
131 Id. at § 2-87(g) ("Any person who files a false sworn statement under division 5 (Lob-
byists) . . . is subject to criminal prosecution for perjury.").
132 Id. at § 2-87(f)(5) ("Each day after any filing deadline imposed by division 5 (Lobby-
ists) ... for which any required statement has not been filed, or for which a statement on file is
incorrect, misleading, or incomplete, constitutes a separate offense.").
133 Cf. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Senators Vote to Forgo Lobbyist-Bought Meals, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A4 (quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd as stating that "[t]here is an undue
advantage given to those who are able to take a member or senior staff member out for a
meal").
134 Cf. Liz Austin, $700,000 Pours in for Craddick Apartment: Watchdog Groups Say the
High-Profile Donors Could Benefit in the Future, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, at 6B (stating
that "watchdog groups [were] aghast" that "persons who could benefit from future legislation,"
including "[b]usinessmen, a lobbyist and a major corporate foundation," donated almost
$700,000 to renovate the Texas House Speaker's apartment inside the state capitol building);
Julie Mason et al., Embattled DeLay Will Quit the Race, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2006, at Al
(stating that a member of Congress had "been under a near-constant ethical cloud since ... he
was shown on national TV wearing knickers and playing golf on a trip paid for by lobbyists");
Editorial, In This Corner, Reid's Hypocrisy: Senate Minority Leader Accepts Boxing Tickets
After Proposing A Bill That Would Impact the Sport, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 1,
2006, at 6B (opining that "the mere appearance of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the
transgression itself").
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gift will diminish confidence in the government, making democracy less
effective. 135
Two common types of gifts that lobbyists give to public servants are
meals and entertainment. It is difficult to see why either of these prac-
tices should be tolerated. Where the meals or entertainment are extrava-
gant-as in the case of weekends at resorts, 136 skybox seats, 137 or trips
abroad138-the ethical issues are obvious. 139 Where the amounts spent
are small-as in the case of lunches during a legislative session' 4 0-the
expenditures nevertheless erode the public's confidence in its elected
representatives. It appears that the parties footing the bills enjoy privi-
leged standing that is not available to others who fail to proffer such
gratuities. At the federal level, members of Congress 141 and other public
officials and employees 142 are paid a living wage. There is no reason to
rely on lobbyists to feed, clothe, or entertain federal public servants. At
the state and local levels, some public officials are not paid ade-
135 See John D. Feerick et al., Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need for a New Ap-
proach, 10 PACE L. REV. 107, 129 (1990) (arguing that "[i]n a democracy, distrust can be as
damaging as corruption itself'); cf Stolberg, supra note II ("Comprehensive lobbying reform
is the right thing to do... [T]o regain the trust of the American people in this institution, we
must go further than prosecuting the bad actors." (quoting Speaker of the House Dennis
Hastert)).
136 See William Kistner & Steve Henn, The Lobbyist, AM. RADIOWORKS, http://ameri-
canradioworks.publicradio.org/features/staffers/al.html (discussing a lobbyist-the younger
brother of a congressman-who "set out to influence a $300 billion highway bill" by taking
"two key congressional staffers to a celebrated resort" where they spent the weekend with the
lobbyist's client).
137 See Fredreka Schouten & Larry Weisman, Senators Will Have to Pay for Their Seats
in Skyboxes if Ban Approved, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2007, at I (stating that under Senate rules
lawmakers have long enjoyed luxury skyboxes "because the tickets often bore no prices or
were valued at below the [$50] gift limit").
138 See, e.g., Jim Morris, Privately Sponsored Trips Hot Tickets on Capitol Hill: Study
Finds Almost $50 Million Spent on Travel For Lawmakers, Aides, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
June 5, 2006, http://www.publicintegrity.org/powertrips/report.aspx?aid=799# (discussing the
former House majority whip's $28,000 golf trip to Scotland, which was sponsored by a lobby-
ist who later pleaded guilty to fraud, conspiracy and tax evasion).
139 See REMINI, supra note 56, at 480 (noting scandals between 1975 and 1990 where
federal officers "were guilty of accepting personal gifts ... and other gratuities such as luxury
hotel accommodations, golf outings and the like"). The problems posed by extravagant meals
and entertainment are similar to those posed by large expenditures in political campaigns. See
Thurber, supra note 12, at 153 (discussing how the "amount of issue advertising expenditures
can dwarf the input from constituents and less well-funded groups" and result in "a narrowing
of public policy options because only those groups that have sufficient resources are heard").
140 Cf Scharrer, supra note 43, at IA (quoting a former Texas state legislator as saying,
"[y]ou can walk into the Legislature any day and watch when they break for lunch ...
[L]egislators look up to the gallery and just point to a lobbyist-'Take me to lunch.'").
141 "The current salary for rank-and-file members of the House and Senate is $165,200
per year." Salaries and Benefits of U.S. Congress Members, http://usgovinfo.about.com/li-
brary/weekly/aa031200a.htm.
142 U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., SALARIES AND WAGES: 2006 SALARY TABLES AND
RELATED INFORMATION (2006), http://www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/index.asp.
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quately,143 but the solution to that problem is to pay them fair compensa-
tion, not to rely on lobbyists to cover the deficiency.
Public servants should not be permitted to sell their time. While "a
steak... might not 'buy' lawmakers.... it's almost certain to buy access
[to them]."144 Recent figures for the Texas legislature show that
"[s]pending on food, entertainment, and gifts . . . [amounted] to about
$15,900 worth of perks for each of the 181 lawmakers-more than
double their $7,200-a-year salary." 145 Until recently, many members of
Congress flew on corporate jets at heavily discounted rates, "a practice
that gives precious access to lobbyists, who often go along for the
trip." 146 Such "[t]rips 'violate the principle of fairness. In order to get
this special kind of access, you have to pay a lot of money. ' 1 47 Re-
cently, the House 148 and Senate 149 banned such travel. The public is right
to be concerned about gifts to public officials and their staff members,
for "[a] review of thousands of state records shows legislation is often
introduced by powerful lawmakers after lobbyists spend lavishly on their
campaigns and entertain them."' 50
The best practice 151 is to ban gifts from lobbyists entirely. A total
ban is easy to understand and enforce. However, total bans on gifts are
extremely difficult to enact or continue in force. According to the Better
Government Association, more than half of the states have not enacted
143 In San Antonio, Texas, city council members receive no salary and are paid a mere
$20 for attending each council meeting. See Vincent R. Johnson, A Well-Run City Worth the
Cost, May 9, 2004, SAN ANTONIO-ExPRESS-NEWS, at 5H (supporting a proposed city charter
amendment to pay salaries to members of city council; the amendment failed).
144 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting Robert Stem, president of the nonparti-
san Center for Governmental Studies in California).
145 Id.
146 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Lobbying Limits by Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2006, at AI (discussing a bill that failed to "rein in" use of corporate jets). See also
BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN
DREAM 137-38 (2006) (discussing the comforts enjoyed by politicians flying on private jets).
147 See Morris, supra note 138 (quoting Professor Dennis Thompson of Harvard
University).
t48 See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., I10th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007),
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/l Oth.pdf; see also H. Res. 6, 110th Cong.
§§ 205-08 (2007) (enacted), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/1 10 Hres6.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007); Kirkpatrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (stating that the new
House rules "ban lawmakers from using corporate jets and reimbursing the owners").
149 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the reform).
15o Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing lobbying in Texas).
151 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (stating that a statute implementing
"best practices" would provide, among other things, that "state officers and employees are
prohibited from accepting any gifts/trips/honoraria from lobbyists"); Editorial, What Real Re-
form Looks Like, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2006, at B8 [hereinafter Real Reform]
("True reform would totally ban gifts and privately paid travel; if a trip is worth taking to do
the people's business, it's worth the people paying for it.").
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any restrictions on gifts, trips, and honoraria given by lobbyists., 52 When
the funds originate with lobbyists, only six states have banned all gifts,
only six states have banned all trips, and only three states have banned all
honoraria.' 53 In some states, local restrictions are more stringent than
state limitations. Yet, even where such variation is permitted by state
law, 154 there is often a lack of political resolve to enact restrictions. At
the federal level, the House recently passed a total ban on gifts from
lobbyists, 55 but a similar ban had been the law just a decade earlier,' 56
only to be jettisoned for more lenient rules when that was politically
feasible. The recent House reform was quickly followed by a similar
reform in the Senate.' 57
Absent a total ban, a dollar limitation can be imposed on gifts from
lobbyists. 58 Such a restriction can be enforced through disclosure re-
quirements that compel recipients 159 or their lobbyist-donors 160 to reveal
the source, nature, and value of gifts. 16 1 However, disclosure is not a
panacea. A study of privately funded congressional travel found that dis-
closure forms were often too vague or incomplete to determine whether
the trip was legitimate. 162
152 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria Detail.
153 See id.
154 "Many state gift laws also cover local officials and employees. Some states permit
local jurisdictions to impose restrictions more stringent than under state law. Other states leave
local gift regulation entirely to local governments and agencies." Nielsen et al., supra note 3,
at 633.
155 See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., 110th Cong. XXV, cl.5 (2007); Kirk-
patrick, Senate Feels Heat, supra note 9 (reporting that "[t]he new House rules bar members
from taking gifts, meals or trips paid for by lobbyists, or the organizations that employ them").
156 See Jane Hook, Lobbyists Still Cozy Up, Even With Gift Ban, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1996, at 1 (indicating that under the earlier House rules "members and their staffs generally
[.. (could not] accept gifts from anyone but family and friends," although there were compli-
cated exceptions); David Jackson, Congress May Lift Gift Ban for Party Conventions, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996 (stating that under the strict House rules, members could "accept no gifts
or meals. Not a pencil or a pad of paper.").
157 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 8 (discussing the change).
158 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHics OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
67(i) (2006) (providing that "[a] person who lobbies.., shall not give gifts to a City official or
a City employee or his or her immediate family, save and except for (1) items received that are
of nominal value; or (2) meals in an individual expense of $50 or less at any occurrence, and
no more than a cumulative value of $500 in a single calendar year, from a single source. . ., or
(3) other gifts" specifically permitted by a general rule on gifts).
159 See, e.g., id. at § 2-74(n) (requiring city council members and others to disclose in
writing gifts worth more than $100, with certain exceptions).
160 See, e.g., id. at § 2-66(a)(6) (requiring lobbyists to disclose in writing gifts to city
officials greater than $50 in value, with certain exceptions).
161 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 26 (recommending that in state govern-
ment, "[a]ll gifts/trips/honoraria valued more than $10 received from lobbyists must be
disclosed").
162 See Morris, supra note 138.
2006]
26 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
To be effective, a dollar limitation on gifts, trips, and honoraria
must be low. The Better Government Association uses a scoring system
for rating integrity in state government. A state receives a score of zero if
it has no cap; a score of 1 if the cap is above $250; a score of 2 if the cap
is between $100 and $250; a score of 3 if the cap is below $100; and the
highest score of 4 if the state has a total ban. 163 In each of three catego-
ries, (gifts, trips, and honoraria) a majority of the states received a score
of zero.164 It is also important for rules limiting gifts to public officials to
define the list of restricted gifts broadly to include any type of benefit
with pecuniary value 16 5- i.e. loans and the like. 166 Otherwise, it will be
possible to circumvent the ban through artful planning.
In comparison to an outright ban, a rule with dollar limitations and
disclosure requirements is further hampered by the subtle temptations
posed by gifts. More than half a century ago, former Senator Paul Doug-
las correctly observed that "[w]hat happens is a gradual shifting of a
man's loyalties from the community to those who have been doing him
favors."' 167 As Douglas explained, "[t]hroughout this whole process the
official will claim-and may indeed believe-that there is no causal con-
nection between the favors he has received and the decisions which he
makes."' 68 Thus, the "whole process may be so subtle as not to be de-
tected by the official himself."' 169
Beyond the issue of whether there is political resolve to limit gifts
from lobbyists lies an important issue of equitable dimensions. That issue
is the question of how to define a "lobbyist" for purposes of applying the
rule. Does the term "lobbyist" only refer to someone who is paid to peti-
tion the government on behalf of another, or does the term also include
persons who volunteer their services to represent others, or even individ-
uals who act on their own behalf in petitioning the government? 170 What
163 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25-26.
164 Id. at app. Gifts, Trips and Honoraria Detail.
165 However, state lobbyist codes often contain exceptions. "Recognizing the 'incidental'
nature or 'public benefit' of certain gifts, many laws exempt simple meals, token items or
mementos, tickets to social, charitable or political events, randomly selected prizes, educa-
tional or fact-finding trips, and certain other things of minimum value from the definition of a
'gift."' Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 669.
166 Cf REMINI, supra note 56, at 424 (reporting that, during the 1970s, a proposal in the
House to investigate bank lobbyists was voted down because it would have embarrassed a
member of Congress who was the "lucky beneficiary of more than $100,000 in relatively
unsecured loans from half a dozen banks").
167 Cox, supra note 71, at 291-92 (citing PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS 1N GOVERNMENT 44
(1952)).
168 Id. at 292.
169 Id.
170 For purposes of lobbyist regulations, sometimes a person who might logically be con-
sidered a "client" is deemed to be a "lobbyist." See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF
THE CI'T OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(g) (2006) ("If an agent or employee engages in lobbying for
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good reason could justify allowing individual citizens or volunteer surro-
gates seeking to influence legislation or official decisions to give gifts to
public servants, if paid surrogates are restricted from freely doing so?
Should not the same rules apply to each type of actor? There is a serious
risk that a rule drafted too narrowly will be circumvented. For example,
although lobbyists are now prohibited from paying for travel by members
of Congress, their clients may do so if the trip is connected to the mem-
bers' official duties.' 7 ' A recent study showed that during a six-year pe-
riod, "[p]rivate groups, corporations or trade associations-many with
legislation that could affect them pending before Congress-paid nearly
$50 million . . . to send members of Congress and their staffers on at
least 23,000 trips overseas and within the United States."' 72
Gifts (including meals, travel, and entertainment) given by individu-
als or entities are arguably just as pernicious as gifts from paid lobbyists.
Yet prohibiting such gratuities may be difficult or impossible. A rule of
such breadth would be even more difficult to enact than one that applies
only to paid lobbyists. Politicians opposed to ethics reform often propose
such wide-reaching rules, knowing they cannot be enacted.' 73 In addi-
tion, enforcing a ban on gifts given to public servants by any person in
the community may necessitate considerably broader enforcement mech-
anisms than a rule targeting only paid lobbyists.
Similar issues arise with respect to the rules governing false state-
ments of fact, 174 but perhaps not as sharply. The fact that paid lobbyists
are formally prevented from knowingly or recklessly lying does not im-
ply that such conduct is permissible on the part of others. Lying is malum
in se.175 Moreover, few persons would seek to circumvent the ban on
lobbyist falsity by lying to public servants personally. In contrast, a ban
on gifts from lobbyists might imply that gifts from others are permissi-
ble. Such conduct is merely malum prohibitum, 76 not malum in se. In
addition, it is foreseeable that a client might seek to avoid the ban by
a principal or employer, both the agent and the principal, or the employee and the employer,
are lobbyists.").
171 See Philip Shenon, Firm Says House Lawyers Approved Payments for Trips, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2005, at A13 (discussing congressional trips paid for by lobbyists' clients).
172 James Kuhnhenn, Study: Millions Spent on Trips for Congress, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 6, 2006, at A4 (citing a study conducted by the Center for Public Integrity,
American Public Media, and Northwestern University's Medill News Service).
173 Ben Smith, Legislature 2004: Amendments Put Ethics Bill in Danger, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Mar. 16, 2004, at Dl (discussing approval of an ethics bill in the Georgia Senate with
amendments "so strict and potentially unconstitutional" that it "stood little chance of passage
in the House").
174 See discussion supra subpart Ill.A.l.
175 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "malum in se" as a
"crime or an act that is inherently immoral").
176 See id. (defining "malum prohibitum" as "[a]n act that is a crime merely because it is
prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral").
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making gifts personally or through a volunteer. 177 Obviously, these is-
sues are complex, and more will be said below about the challenges of
defining the term "lobbyist.""' 78
Another important question related to rules banning gifts is which
public servants should be subject to the ban. Studies of privately funded
congressional travel show that "[a]lmost three-quarters of all trips were
taken" not by members of Congress but "by aides, who often influence
how their bosses vote, negotiate in committee and interact with other
government officials."'179 It might reasonably be urged that lobbyists
should be prohibited from giving gifts to any public official or employee,
including staff members, on the assumption that, if the gift is given, the
lobbyist believes there is an advantage to be obtained. However, "many
states have elaborate ethics statutes specifically proscribing [which] offi-
cials are covered."' 80 Such laws create exemptions from coverage that
are unwise and reflect a lack of political will on the part of lawmakers to
effectively address the dangers associated with gratuities. The new
House Rules wisely frame their ban on gifts from lobbyists in broad
terms that apply not just to members, but to any employee of the
House.' 8 '
Cynics can argue with historical accuracy that public life has never
been free from gifts by lobbyists to public officials. 182 In the nineteenth
century, legislators rode the trains for free, "courtesy of railroad lobby-
iSts.' 1 83 However, history is no justification for failing to improve the
laws. During the past century, great progress was made in improving the
position of the poor, the disabled, immigrants, women, minorities, em-
ployees, and consumers through laws that addressed the needs of those
groups and that were more fair than those previously in existence. Ethics
177 See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (quoting an individual affiliated with a major
lobbying firm as stating that "[i]f meals [paid for by lobbyists] are heavily restricted, we're
likely to see executives from the home office picking up checks because they're not
lobbyists").
178 See discussion infra subpart LIIBI.
179 Morris, supra note 138.
180 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668.
181 Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R., l10th Cong. XXV, cl.5(a)(l)(A)(ii)
(2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/l 10th.pdf (providing that "[a] Mem-
ber, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer, or employee of the House may not knowingly
accept a gift from a registered lobbyist ... or from a private entity that retains or employs
registered lobbyists or agents of a foreign principal except as provided in subparagraph (3) of
this paragraph").
182 See BERRY, supra note 40, at 48 (arguing that "[i]n spite of numerous reforms
throughout our history, 'interested money' has always found its way to receptive legislators").
Recently, members of Congress have received huge advances on book contracts from large
corporations with interests before Congress. Id. "While Congress forbade bribery of judges in
1790, bribing a legislator was not illegal until 1853." Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESs, supra note 2, at
692.
183 BERRY, supra note 40, at 48.
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in government is now accorded a higher priority than at any time in
American history.' 84 By passing laws that ban or limit gifts from lobby-
ists to public officials or employees, legislators will help to ensure that
all voices will be heard by public representatives on equal terms. It is
important to continually reform the laws in a quest for a more just
society.
When restrictions on gifts, entertainment, and travel are enacted, the
money that would have been spent on those gratuities may be used to
advance the interests of lobbyists' clients in other ways. "[Ijndustries and
interest groups have [already] turned to more sophisticated tactics ...
[Lobbyists] are increasing their campaign contributions, widening their
use of the Internet to stir voter activism, and donating large sums to think
tanks and charities affiliated with" members of the House or Senate.' 85
However, that redirection of funds may further the interests of democ-
racy if those expenditures result in a more transparent and open political
process. For example, it might be a desirable development for "The Busi-
ness Roundtable, which represents big-business chieftains, . . [to em-
brace] a new technique of advertising on Web sites for grassroots
advocates."' 8 6 The goal behind regulating gifts from lobbyists is to re-
move impediments to political discourse and even-handed decision mak-
ing, not to discourage individuals from pursuing innovative ways to
petition the government.
3. Campaign Contributions and Fundraising
The great exception to limitations on gifts by lobbyists is lawful
campaign contributions made or orchestrated by lobbyists. Campaign
money often dwarfs lobbyists' expenditures on gratuities such as meals,
travel, and entertainment.' 87 Like gifts, those contributions can be a way
to buy access to legislators' 88 and perhaps votes. 189 In some cases,
184 Cf. Cox, supra note 71, at 281 ("For twenty years or more, extraordinary public atten-
tion has been focused upon the ethics of government officials.").
185 Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12.
186 However, the same cannot be said where "organizations from the left and right are
increasingly offering meetings with top government officials in exchange for hefty dues." Id.
187 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that in the 2000 election cycle, "the top
twenty-five lobbying firms spent over $4 million"). "Many of the top twenty-five ... firms
also contributed services (either in-kind or for a fee), such as strategic advice about finance,
media, and grassroots activities, directly to the 2000 presidential and congressional cam-
paigns." Id. at 157. See also Anne E. Komblutt et al., The Abramoff Case: The Overview,
Lobbyist Accepts Plea Deal and Becomes Star Witness in a Wider Corruption Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at Al (discussing a lobbyist who "helped funnel more than $1.5 million in
campaign donations to hundreds of elected officials").
188 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50 (stating that contributions create access to
legislators for lobbyists).
189 See Jennifer McKee, Burns Did About-Face After Cash from Lobbyist, MISSOULIAN,
Dec. 3, 2005, at Al (asserting that records show that a U.S. senator from Montana "changed
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"[r]egular contributors attend dozens of fund-raisers a year and become
part of the 'circuit' of lobbyists around a cadre of lawmakers and their
committees .... Contacts are made, relationships formed, and networks
established."' 90 Occasionally, the intent of a contribution is blatant. In
1995, an Ohio congressman "passed [campaign contribution] checks
from tobacco lobbyists to other congressmen on the House floor while
lawmakers were considering ending a tobacco subsidy."' 9'
Not surprisingly, some states impose special limitations on cam-
paign donations by lobbyists. Kentucky has a flat ban on campaign con-
tributions. 192 Alaska provides a slight exception to its ban when the
lobbyist's contribution goes to the candidate from the district where the
lobbyist will be eligible to vote on election day.193 Austin, Texas, bars
lobbyists' contributions greater than $25 to members of the city coun-
cil.194 The County of Los Angeles prohibits any contributions to county
officials or candidates by persons who are presently or were, within the
previous twelve months, registered as county lobbyists. 95 Several states
also prohibit lobbyists from attempting to influence the votes of legisla-
tors by promising financial support for the member's candidacy, or by
threatening to contribute financially to an opponent. 196 Unfortunately,
laws in a number of states dilute the effectiveness of their restrictions by
providing that a ban on campaign contributions applies only when the
his stance on a 2001 bill after receiving a $5,000 donation from a lobbyist's client who op-
posed the legislation"), available at 2005 WLNR 22479128 (Westlaw); cf. Hardball with
Chris Matthews (CNBC television broadcast Sept. 28, 2005) (indicating that the House Ethics
Committee admonished a Texas Congressman for "inviting energy lobbyists to a fund-raiser
just before the energy bill was brought to the House floor"), available at 2005 WLNR
15339714 (Westlaw).
190 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 50.
191 Bar( Mills, In Washington, It's Now About Who Cheated the Least, LIMA NEWS
(Ohio), Jan. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1039973 (Westlaw). See also Editorial, A
Hazy Culture, BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 6, 2006, (discussing campaign contributions from
the tobacco industry), available at 2006 WLNR 3837524 (Westlaw).
192 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(6) (West 2004) ("A legislative agent shall not make a
campaign contribution to a legislator, a candidate, or his campaign committee.").
193 ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074(g) (2004).
194 AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-2-9 (2006) ("[N]o person who is compensated
to lobby the city council... and no spouse of any such person may contribute more than $25
in a campaign period to an officeholder or candidate for mayor or city council, or to a specific
purpose political committee involved in an election for mayor or city council.").
195 See Los ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 2-190.130 (2006), available at http://
municipalcodes.lexisnexis.comlcodes/lacounty (follow "Title 2. Administration" hyperlink;
then follow "Chapter 2.190 Political Campaigns for County Offices" hyperlink; then follow
"2.190.130 Lobbyist contributions" hyperlink) (providing in part that "[n]o person or firm who
is registered.., as a county lobbyist or county lobbying firm or who has been so registered at
any time in the previous 12 months shall make any contribution to any county official or
candidate for county office").
196 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-1492(3), (5) (LexisNexis 2002) (prohibiting
such conduct by "any person"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-47.5(b) (2005) (stating that "no per-
son" shall violate the rule).
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legislature is in session. 197 These half-hearted reform efforts seem to as-
sume that either legislators or voters have very short attention spans.
Some lobbyists solicit contributions and hold fundraisers for candi-
dates on behalf of clients seeking government contracts.198 As recently as
the summer of 2006, the (now-former) House majority leader held "fund-
raisers at lobbyists' offices."' 199 This conduct creates the perception "that
these lobbyists may enjoy differential access and may have unfair advan-
tages over others who are not participating in candidate events and fun-
draisers. ' 200 In some states, such conduct by lobbyists is unlawful. For
example, Alaska provides, with limited exceptions, that a lobbyist may
not host a fundraising event or otherwise engage in the fundraising activ-
ity of a legislative campaign or campaign for governor or lieutenant gov-
ernor.20 1 In South Carolina, the rule applies to both lobbyists and their
principals. 20 2 Miami Beach, Florida "bans lobbyists from serving as fun-
draisers if they actively lobby the city. 20 3
Some lobbying firms have formed their own political action com-
mittees (PACs), which presumably are more effective at achieving their
197 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5(1)(1) (2005) ("No professional lobbyist, vol-
unteer lobbyist, or principal ... shall make or promise to make a contribution to, or solicit or
promise to solicit a contribution for ... [a] member of the general assembly or candidate for
the general assembly, when the general assembly is in regular session."); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 68A.504(1) (West 2006) (stating a similar rule including, "in the case of the governor or a
gubernatorial candidate, . . . the thirty days following the adjournment of a regular legislative
session allowed for the signing of bills"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218.942(9)(a)-(c) (Lexis-
Nexis 2005) (stating a similar rule including short periods before and after legislative
sessions).
198 COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND PUBLIC TRUST, A COMMUNITY'S RESOLVE TO RESTORE
INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC TRUST: THE MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE (1996-PRE-
SENT) (Jan. 2004), at 8-9 [hereinafter MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE].
199 Mike Mclntire, New House Majority Leader Keeps Old Ties to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2006, at Al.
200 MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9.
201 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8) (2004). Maryland has extensive rules relating to fun-
draising and political activities by lobbyists. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 15-
713(14)(i)-(iii) (LexisNexis 2004) (providing that a lobbyist shall not, "if serving on the State
or a local central committee of a political party, participate: (i) as an officer of the central
committee; (ii) in fund-raising activity on behalf of the political party; or (iii) in actions relat-
ing to filling a vacancy in a public office"); id. at § 15-714(d)(l)(i)-(v) (stating that a lobbyist
may not, with respect to a number of state offices, engage in "(i) soliciting or transmitting a
political contribution from any person, including a political committee; (ii) serving on a fund-
raising committee or a political committee; (iii) acting as a treasurer for a candidate or official
or as treasurer or chairman of a political committee; (iv) organizing or establishing a political
committee for the purpose of soliciting or transmitting contributions from any person; or (v)
forwarding tickets for fund-raising activities, or other solicitations for political contributions,
to a potential contributor").
202 See S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 2-17-1 10(F) (2005) ("A lobbyist, a lobbyist's principal,
or a person acting on behalf of a lobbyist or a lobbyist's principal may not host events to raise
funds for public officials. No public official may solicit [those persons] to host a fundraising
event for the public official.").
203 MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 9.
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clients' goals. 20 4 However, PACs have the added advantage of making
the sources of campaign donations less clear to political watchdogs. 20 5
Such conduct appears to run afoul of laws prohibiting lobbyists from
directly or indirectly collecting contributions for a candidate. 20 6
The need to finance political campaigns is no reason for failing to
address the problems raised by lobbyist contributions. 20 7 "Full public fi-
nancing of campaigns, approved in three states for legislative and state-
wide races, is considered by many watchdogs to be the best way to end
the campaign money hunt that empowers lobbyists as it drives
candidates . 20 8
4. Revolving-Door Employment
Perhaps no problem in government ethics is easier to understand, or
more difficult to address effectively, than that posed by "revolving-door
employment. ' 20 9 The risk is obvious that a client represented by a pub-
lic-servant-turned-lobbyist will have, or will appear to have, an unfair
advantage in petitioning the government. 2 10 This type of conduct poses a
significant threat to the integrity of democratic institutions. Conse-
quently, Congress 2 1I and a number of state legislatures21 2 have enacted
204 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting one lobbyist as complaining that the
political action committees of influential lobbying firms "shut out other lobbyists, creating in
effect a cartel").
205 See id. (quoting a representative of Texans for Public Justice as stating that such prac-
tices "really muddle the source").
206 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(8).
207 See discussion supra subpart III.A.2.
208 Peggy Fikac, "Clean Elections" Might Wash Away Money's Imprint, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 15, 2006, at IA ("Once you kind of end the money chase, elected offi-
cials are far less susceptible to some of the attractions that lobbyists can offer -i.e., travel,
food, gifts, campaign contributions." (quoting Mary Boyle of Common Cause)).
209 See generally Editorial, The Capitol's Revolting Door, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at
A26 [hereinafter Revolting Door] (discussing "Washington's ever-whirring carousel for busi-
ness lobbyists and government appointees, who spin back and forth between the private and
public sectors in a blur of opportunism").
210 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1886 ("Critics claim that the flood of legislators into
lobbying heightens the perception that lobbyists use personal contacts to take home big
paychecks, and that taxpayers pay the price in the end.").
211 See Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at §§ 10.52-53 (discussing federal laws that re-
strict lobbying by former public officials and employees).
212 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(c) (2004) (providing, with limited exceptions,
that "[a] former member of the legislature may not engage in activity as a lobbyist before the
legislature for a period of one year after the former member has left the legislature"); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (providing that no person shall "[l]obby the legislature
for compensation within one year after the person ceases to be a member of the senate or
house of representatives"). But see LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3,
at §§ 31.52-.53 (stating that New Hampshire does not restrict the employment of former pub-
lic officials or employees); §§ 35.52-.53 (stating that North Carolina has no restrictions on
employment of former public officials and employees).
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laws addressing revolving-door employment. Indeed, even cities,213 in-
cluding some with otherwise weak ethics codes, 214 commonly have re-
volving-door limitations prohibiting former public officials or employees
from "representing" private parties before the government for specified
periods of time. Depending on how the relevant terms are defined, these
city ordinances may treat lobbying as a form of "representation" and thus
limit revolving-door lobbying. 215 Yet, despite such restrictions at all
levels of government, "[s]ome of the most successful [lobbyists] are for-
mer lawmakers[,] or former aides to lawmakers[,] who cycle in and out
of government. '2 16
The problem with most restrictions on revolving-door employment
is that they apply for too short a period of time. 217 For example, with
213 See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-14 (2006) (limiting subsequent repre-
sentation of private interests); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN
ANTONIO § 2-56 (2006) (similar restrictions). For example, a former appointed board member
might be prohibited only from representing persons for compensation before the same board,
but a former elected city council member might be prohibited from representing any person
before any city body. See id. at § 2-57. See Johnson, America's Preoccupation, supra note 73,
at 745-47 (discussing key variables). See generally Mark Davies, Keeping the Faith: A Model
Local Ethics Law-Content and Commentary, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 61, 75-76 (1993) (find-
ing that city prohibitions are typically short in duration (one or two years) and vary in terms of
who is subject to the restrictions, what types of governmental contact are prohibited, and
whether the ban applies only to compensated representation).
214 See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., SAN Jost MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.10.030 (2006) (establish-
ing "revolving door" restrictions).
215 The City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in 1998. As enacted, the
code restricted, for a period of time, "representation" of private interests by former city offi-
cials and employees. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-
56 (1998). That rule clearly limited lobbying by former officials and employees, for the code,
as adopted, included a definition stating that:
"Representation" encompasses all forms of communication and personal appearances in which
a person, not acting in performance of official duties, formally or informally serves as an
advocate for private interests. Lobbying, even on an informal basis, is a form of representation
• Representation does not include appearance as a witness in litigation or other official pro-
ceedings. Id. at § 2-42 (emphasis added). By 2006, the definition of "representation" had been
gutted by an amendment, so that it now reads simply: "'Representation' is a presentation of
fact-either by words or by conduct-made to induce someone to act. Representation does not
include appearance as a witness in litigation or other official proceedings." SAN ANTONIO,
TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-42(bb) (2006). The revised defini-
tion makes it much less clear that the representation rule bars lobbying, and to that extent
substantially weakens the San Antonio ethics code.
216 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70. Some argue that lobbyists with prior experience
in government are an asset to the American political system. "Federal policy-makers, awash in
a flood of competing voices, need reliable information; to the extent that their government
experience fosters such reliability, these [lobbyists] better inform decision making." Kevin T.
McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 J. L. & POL. 113,
135-36 (2000).
217 However, in some circumstances, provisions can be too broad. A rule may, for exam-
ple, expect an improper degree of continuing "loyalty" from one who served in government
only as a volunteer member of a board or commission by imposing restrictions on subsequent
activities that have no relationship to the volunteer's limited range of service in government.
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respect to lobbying by former state legislators, six states only require a
two-year moratorium, twenty states have only a one-year moratorium,
and one state has a mere six month moratorium. 2 18 Other states have no
revolving-door restrictions at all.219 Retired or defeated members of Con-
gress "must sit out one year before doing active lobbying, although they
can offer 'guidance' at up to $500,000 a year."'220 Needless to say, the
connections legislators accrue during years of service often last far
longer than a year or two. This is particularly true at the federal level,
where turnover in Congress is minimal due to careful redistricting that
aggressively protects incumbents. 22'
Revolving-door limitations on lobbyists can be strengthened in a
variety of ways. The length of the ban can be increased (a two-year ban
is stronger than a one-year restriction 222); the number of persons subject
to the ban can be broadened (a ban that applies to all government offi-
cials223 is more potent than one that applies only within the legislative
branch 224); and the ban can be made more extensive with respect to mat-
ters in which the former public servant was closely involved (e.g., a rule
might prohibit lobbying for a longer period of time with respect to mat-
See Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 737-38 ("It is reasonable to expect a
higher degree of loyalty from one who is elected to city office or on the payroll than from a
person who has merely agreed to donate a few hours of service to the work of the government
on an occasional basis by serving on a board or commission ... [The] legitimate expectation
of loyalty from a citizen-volunteer generally extends no further than the scope of the volun-
teer's official duties.").
218 CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, STATE LEGISLATOR REVOLVING DOOR PROVISIONS (Mar. 1,
2006), http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=783.
219 See Fikac, supra note 208 (stating that Texas is one of twenty-three states with "no
prohibition against legislators lobbying state government after they leave office").
220 Real Reform, supra note 151. See generally Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at § 10.52
("Under a federal criminal statute and congressional rules, Members of Congress may not
lobby any Member, officer, or employee of Congress for one year after leaving office.") (cit-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 207(e)-(f); Senate Rule 37 §§ 8-9).
221 See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in
the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 179 (2003) (arguing
that "the "2001-2002 Round of Congressional Redistricting was the most incumbent-friendly
in modem American history" because new district lines insulated incumbents from competi-
tion and "froze into place ... a 'distributional bias' that gives Republicans a roughly 50-seat
head start in the battle for control of Congress").
222 Compare ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(2) (2004) (stating a one-year limitation),
with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.811(8) (West 2004) (prohibiting legislators from serving as
lobbyists for two years). See also Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing proposed
federal legislation to increase a one-year ban to two years).
223 See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-42(u)
(2006) (defining city "officials" for purposes of the city ethics code, including its revolving-
door provisions, as the mayor, members of city council, municipal judges and magistrates, and
many others).
224 See Lisa Berman, Change in New Jersey Lobby Law Inspires Firm Subsidiary, 27
NAT'L L.J. 10 (2006) (discussing how old regulations, which required lobbyists to register if
they "wanted to influence regulations or legislation," were broadened in New Jersey to include
"attempts to affect administrative and bureaucratic decisions in the executive branch").
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ters in which the former official or employee "personally and substan-
tially" participated2 25).
Some reformers also advocate placing limits on the ability of lobby-
ists to be appointed to positions in government. For example, during re-
cent efforts to strengthen the law in Georgia an amendment was
proposed that would have prevented "the appointment of lobbyists for
one year following the expiration of the lobbyist's registration 'to any
state office, board, authority, commission, or bureau' that regulates the
activities of a firm on whose behalf they had lobbied. '2 26 The City of
Austin, Texas, prohibits lobbyists from being appointed to a "city-estab-
lished board, commission, or committee within three years of engaging
in lobbying activity. ' 227 As a matter of public policy, these regulations
make good sense. The underlying concern is similar to an "administra-
tive capture" scenario, where an administrative agency is dominated by
those it is supposed to regulate2 28 and becomes less effective as a re-
sult.229 By limiting the ease with which lobbyists are able to move into
appointed governmental positions, revolving-door limitations preserve a
healthy distance between those who seek the aid of government and
those who make decisions.230
225 "Under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, top executive branch officials are barred,
for one year after leaving government, from representing anyone before their former agency;
officials are permanently barred from lobbying on issues that are directly related to their for-
mer areas of responsibility." GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718. "Cabinet-level em-
ployees are subject to a more extensive prohibition that covers lobbying communications
throughout the executive branch." Minor & Regan, supra note 2, at § 10.53 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 207(d)).
226 Stephanie D. Campanella, et al., Election: Georgia Ethics in Government Act, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 129, 137 (2004) (discussing a failed effort to reform state ethics laws).
227 AUSTIN, TEX., AUSTIN CITY CODE § 2-1-8 (2006).
228 See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, "I'll Sell It to You at Cost": Legal Methods to
Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1070 & n.87 (1990) ("Regulated
agencies ...can be 'captured' by the very firms they are mandated to regulate. Captured
agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations.").
229 See Christopher Wyeth Kirkham, Note, Busting the Administrative Trust: An Experi-
mentalist Approach to Universal Service Administration in Telecommunications Policy, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 623 (1998) ("Administrative capture by special interests leads to policy
approaches that often fail to account for the interests of the less influential public."). Adminis-
trative capture may occur as a result of revolving-door movement between the private and
public sectors. See Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 93, at 1051-52 ("The risks that
agency determinations may unfairly favor the interests of the companies seeking regulatory
approval are all the more ominous in view of the revolving door between government work
and the private sector, which tempts agency employees to render decisions which may enhance
their own employment chances with the same regulated firms they are charged with
overseeing.").
230 Cf Laura Mansnerus, A Shadowy Web of State Agencies and Developers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2005, at 14 NJ 1 (discussing the questionable use of the appointment process in New
Jersey to forge connections between state government and private enterprise). 'We put devel-
opers on boards who take care of other developers who sit on other boards who then take care
of them,' said Jeff Tittel, the director of the state chapter of the Sierra Club." Id.
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The general brevity and limited scope of existing revolving-door
restrictions reflect present (although not necessarily inevitable) political
realities. Consequently, stronger revolving-door limitations will likely
appear at the margins, rather than through sweeping changes to existing
practices. 23' Even so, there is reason to hope that, at the federal level,
former members of Congress who become lobbyists will be banned from
engaging in the most blatant practices, such as lobbying current members
on the House floor or in the House gym and dining room.232
5. Contingent-Fee Lobbying
Some lobbyist compensation arrangements pose more serious
threats to the public interest than others. A lobbyist whose fee is contin-
gent on success has a greater incentive to "win at all costs," in contrast to
lobbyists who are paid an hourly fee, a lump-sum fee, or a monthly re-
tainer.233 As a result, contingent fee arrangements may promote the use
of "improper means, such as distorting relevant facts, to ensure suc-
cess. '234 Contingent fees, or "success fees,' 23 5 may also over-compen-
sate lobbyists. 236
In personal-injury tort litigation, contingent fees pose similar
problems. A lawyer who will not be paid unless his or her client wins has
a strong desire to prevail regardless of the facts unearthed during litiga-
tion. Nevertheless, contingent fee representation of personal injury
claimants is widely permitted. 237 Such arrangements for financing the
costs of legal services play an important role in ensuring that all injured
persons, particularly the poor, will have equal access to the courts.2 38
While contingent-fee legal representation may be a type of social
231 But see Real Reform, supra note 151 ("True reform would.., forbid former members
of Congress--or their spouses-from sliding over into lobbying jobs.").
232 Id. (arguing for the elimination of "sweetheart deal[s] that allow[ ] former members
access to the House floor and privileges in the House gym and dining room").
233 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 121-22 (discussing hourly rates and monthly retainers).
234 City of Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 1322, 1324-26
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that there "is a legitimate public policy concern" and calling
the issue "to the attention of the Bench and Bar").
235 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 (demonstrating synonymous usage).
236 See MIAMI-DADE EXPERIENCE, supra note 198, at 8 ("There is some evidence to sup-
port the proposition that lobbyists receive exorbitant fees either in the form of hefty retainers
or in the form of success fees.").
237 Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Resp., Formal Op. 94-389 (1994) ("[T]he charg-
ing of a contingent fee, in personal injury and in all other permissible types of litigation, as
well as in numerous non-litigation matters, does not violate ethical standards as long as the fee
is appropriate in the circumstances and reasonable in amount.").
238 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. b (2000)
("Contingent-fee arrangements ... enable persons who could not otherwise afford counsel to
assert their rights, paying their lawyers only if the assertion succeeds."); Vincent R. Johnson
and Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary
Lawyering, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 359, 393 (1990).
[Vol. 16:1
REGULATING LOBBYISTS
"evil"-in the sense that it may result in overzealous lawyering or over-
compensation-it is also a socially beneficial "necessary evil."
The same is not true with respect to lobbying. Relatively few lobby-
ists represent consumers and nonprofit organizations, 239 and even fewer
serve the poor or disadvantaged. 24° Contingent-fee lobbying is more
likely to promote the interests of big business, for business-related lobby-
ing is where the most money can be made.24' One recent change in the
tax laws, resulting from aggressive lobbying, saved sixty companies the
breathtaking sum of "roughly $100 billion. '242 There is little reason to
think that contingent-fee lobbying would benefit the poor2 4 3 or reduce
the disparities between "haves" and "have nots. ' 244
Numerous court decisions have condemned lobbyists' contingent
fees. 245 For example, more than 130 yeas ago in Trist v. Child,246 the
Supreme Court held that a contingent-fee agreement to lobby a private
239 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (stating that in Texas "[a]bout 30 of the 1,700
lobbyists work for consumer and environmental groups, according to Texans for Pubic
Justice").
240 See Scharrer, supra note 43 ("[T]he interests of low income children and nonprofit
institutions often lose out when they collide with money players in the state Capitol, where
companies with deep pockets hire high-powered lobbyists to protect their interests."). See also
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clients' Rewards Keep K Street Lobbyists Thriving, WASH. POST, Feb.
14, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Birnbaum, Clients' Rewards] ("Congressional critics complain
that average voters are left out when private lobbyists rush in.").
241 Another reason may be that lobbying by non-profit organizations historically was lim-
ited by provisions in the Internal Revenue Code granting tax-free status. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (stating restriction); see also BERRY, supra note 40, at 47 (discussing how non-
profit organizations cope with the restrictions on lobbying, for example by telling their constit-
uents to contact their legislators, but "refraining from telling them to urge their legislators to
vote in a particular way"). However, since 1976, "tax-deductible nonprofits have [had] the
option of the 'H' election, allowing them to ignore the 'substantial' limitation on lobbying."
Id. at 54. Thus, there are really two federal policies on lobbying by nonprofits: "one policy
sharply restricts lobbying; the other allows for virtually unlimited lobbying." Id. "The IRS has
made it remarkably easy for a nonprofit to take the H election." id. at 56. Yet, "[miost non-
profits have no idea that there is such a thing as the H election, and only about 2.5 percent...
choose this path." Id. at 57.
242 Birnbaum, Clients' Rewards, supra note 240 (indicating that the corporations spent
$1.6 million dollars on lobbying efforts).
243 But see Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the Right to Petition:
Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 559, 587 (1998) (arguing that bans on contingent-fee lobbying often preclude individu-
als and organizations with few financial resources from lobbying).
244 See David Westphal, Gap Between Rich and Poor Looks to Be Widening, FRESNO
BEE, Jan. 27, 2006, at AI0 (discussing income inequality).
245 See, e.g., Grover v. Merritt Dev. Co., 47 F. Supp. 309, 319 (D.C. Minn. 1942) (hold-
ing that a contingent fee lobbying agreement was against public policy, malum in se, and void,
and that no recovery could be had either for amount of fee or on a quantum meruit basis).
246 88 U.S. 441 (1874).
2006]
38 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
bill through Congress was void and unenforceable. 247 Justice Swayne's
opinion for the Court condemned lobbying generally, 248 and contingent-
fee lobbying in particular, regardless of whether there was evidence of
actual abuse.249 "Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the hope
of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage
upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form
is greatly increased. '250 Other Supreme Court cases have held that
"[c]ontingent fee contracts to secure Government business for the em-
ployer of the recipient are invalid because of their tendency to induce
improper solicitation of public officers and the exercise of political
pressure.",251
However, "there are no modern federal cases dealing with contin-
gency fee lobbying. '252 While Trist and related cases 253 have not been
247 Id. at 452; but see Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 276 (1880) (distinguishing an
impermissible contingent fee from a permissible percentage fee established by the "custom of
commission merchants and brokers").
248 The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and exertions
of the lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private
claim, without reference to its merits, by means which, if not corrupt, were illegiti-
mate, and considered in connection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake,
contrary to the plainest principles of public policy.... If any of the great corpora-
tions of the country were to hire adventurers who make market of themselves in this
way, to procure the passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their
private interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively de-
nounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment as
infamous.
Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1874).
249 No one has a right, in such circumstances, to put himself in a position of tempta-
tion to do what is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law forbids the
inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the undertaking... The elder
agent in this case is represented to have been a lawyer of ability and high character
- This can make no difference as to the legal principles we have considered.
Id. at 451-53.
250 Id. at 452.
251 Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 64 (1945). See also Crocker v. United States, 240
U.S. 74, 78-79 (1916) (finding that there was "an obvious departure from recognized legal and
moral standards" where a company employed an agent with "compensation contingent upon
success, to secure the contract for furnishing.., satchels" to the federal government. Because
of their baneful tendency ... [such] agreements ... are deemed inconsistent with sound morals
and public policy, and therefore invalid").
252 Capps, supra note 40, at 1890.
253 See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 336 (1853) ("[A]ll contracts
for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or to use personal or any secret or
sinister influence on legislators, [are] void by the policy of the law."). In Providence Tool Co.
v. Norris, a case involving a procurement contract, Justice Stephen Field wrote for the Court:
Legislation should be prompted solely from considerations of the public good, and
the best means of advancing it. Whatever tends to divert the attention of legislators
from their high duties, to mislead their judgments, or to substitute other motives for
their conduct than the advancement of the public interests, must necessarily and
directly tend to impair the integrity of our political institutions. Agreements for com-
pensation contingent upon success, suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for
the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and
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overruled, some have expressed doubt about their continuing validity.254
Congress' recent failure to enact a ban on contingent-fee lobbying 255 led
one law review article to conclude that "lobbyists are still free to receive
contingency fees for lobbying members of Congress. '256 However,
"[m]ost states prohibit the payment of fees contingent on the outcome of
legislation and or administrative action. ' 25 7 The same is true of many
cities.2 58
Yet, in other contexts no such action has been taken. 259 This void
represents an opportunity for strengthening the rules governing the con-
duct of lobbyists. It is bad enough that lobbying firms sometimes solicit
clients "with virtual guarantees that they . . . [can] deliver 'dollars for
pennies' (or billions for millions). '260 There is no need to add contin-
gency fee incentives to the mix. When challenged, almost all bans on
contingent-fee lobbying have been found to be constitutional. 26'
strikes down the contract from its inception. There is no real difference in principle
between agreements to procure favors from legislative bodies, and agreements to
procure favors in the shape of contracts from the heads of departments.
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 45, 54-55 (1864).
254 See Florida League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 458 (1Ith Cir.
1996) (discussing arguments that "interim developments of First Amendment law establish
conclusively that the Supreme Court today would strike a contingency-fee ban on lobbying").
255 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1888 ("[N]one of the proposed legislation has passed.").
256 Id.
257 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 86205(0
(West 2005) (providing that no lobbyist or lobbying firm shall "[aiccept or agree to accept any
payment in any way contingent upon the defeat, enactment, or outcome of any proposed legis-
lative or administrative action"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-5 (LexisNexis 2003) (stating a
similar rule). "The following states are currently silent on the issue: Louisiana, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. A couple of states (Tennessee and West Virginia) re-
quire special disclosure or written agreements for contingent fee lobbying. Delaware limits
such fees to no more than half the compensation paid to a lobbyist." Nielsen et al., supra note
3, at 667. See generally LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3 (detailing
restrictions on contingent-fee lobbying, state by state).
258 See MIAMI, FLA., CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, § 2-658 (2006) ("No
person shall retain or employ a lobbyist for compensation based on a contingency fee."); see
also Rome v. Upton, 648 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (I11. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a state ban on
contingent fee lobbying extended to city councils).
259 See Capps, supra note 40, at 1887 ("Contingency fee lobbying contracts have become
surprisingly common" and "the media has uncovered various examples at the state and local
levels.").
260 See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra note 51, at 14.
261 See Meggs, 87 F.3d at 458 (upholding a ban on "contingency-fee lobbying despite
whatever doubts recent cases may have cast on its constitutionality"); Capps, supra note 40, at
1891 ("[State bans] have generally withstood constitutional challenge in the courts."). But see
Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981) (striking down a ban on
contingency-fee lobbying as overbroad).
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6. Business Transactions with and Employment by Lobbyists
Business transactions represent another means by which public offi-
cials and employees can become indebted to lobbyists. "[F]ormer House
speaker James Wright was routinely paid huge sums of money for speak-
ing to lobbyists, who covered the expense by 'buying' signed copies of
his book for all of their members. '2 62 Such transactions create an appear-
ance of impropriety, threaten to bias public officials in favor of the lob-
byist's clients, and generally compromise the goal of a level playing field
in public life. Such ethical problems are exacerbated when the transac-
tion involves payment of an amount in excess of fair market value. One
newspaper reported that a city councilman offered his vanity-press
Frankenstein sequel for $500 per autographed copy, and that an appreci-
ative lobbyist paid that amount.263 Indiana, quite sensibly, bars state of-
ficers and employees from receiving compensation for "the sale or lease
of any property or service which substantially exceeds that which... [he
or she] would charge in the ordinary course of business. '2 64
Despite the obvious problems associated with business transactions
between lobbyists and public servants, various obstacles stand in the way
of crafting an effective ban on fair-market-value transactions. For exam-
ple, a member of a city council may also own a coffee shop. Should it be
impermissible for a lobbyist who represents clients before the city coun-
cil to patronize that member's coffee shop occasionally? What if the lob-
byist patronizes the coffee shop every day, or recruits his or her clients
and their friends to do business at the establishment? A rule banning de
minimis business transactions probably serves no good purpose, but dif-
ferentiating those purchases from ones that are objectionable is difficult.
One possible approach would be to exclude "routine" transactions, 265 or
262 See BGA INTEGRITY INDEX, supra note 101, at 25.
263 See Chris Williams, Frankenstein Sequel Ready, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept.
23, 1999, at 7B (describing the book written by city councilman Mario Salas); Chris Williams,
Contribution to Book Questioned, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 23, 1999, at IB (stating
that a lobbyist's contribution to publication of a city councilman's novel "raised red flags
among government ethicists and even other lobbyists"); Chris Williams, Salas Ruling Ques-
tioned: City Attorney "Missed the Ball," SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, Sept. 28, 1999, at IA
(questioning an ethics opinion finding that the book-publishing deal did not violate the city
ethics code).
264 IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-7(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
265 Other areas of the law have addressed similar drafting problems. Some ethics codes
prohibit public officials from taking official action that affects the economic interests of a
"client," and provide that "[tihe term client includes business relationships of a highly person-
alized nature, but not ordinary business-customer relationships." See SAN ANTONIO, TEX.,
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 (2006). Under that type of provision,
routine transactions fall outside the scope of the rule. "[A] city official who owns a coffee shop
would not have to abstain from participation in a matter relating to one of the many hundreds
of customers who occasionally buy a cup of coffee at the shop because the relationship is not
'highly personalized."' See Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 770 n.255.
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transactions that do not create an appearance of impropriety. However,
such vague distinctions may be subject to challenge on the ground that
they fail to provide clear notice of what is prohibited.266
If it is problematic for public servants to engage in business transac-
tions with lobbyists, it is even worse for them to be on a lobbyist's pay-
roll. In Oregon, a now-former Speaker of the House announced, "almost
a year before his legislative term would end, that he would not seek re-
election and that he had accepted ajob with the nurserymen's group. '26 7
Although the Speaker assured the public that he would "not lobby the
legislature on issues that concerned the ... [group] while he remained in
office," he attended candidate endorsement meetings as a representative
of the group, [while] the Oregon legislature continued to assemble"
under the Speaker's leadership. 26 8 In a second Oregon case, another for-
mer Speaker of the House "started a lobbying firm and introduced legis-
lation on behalf of his new clients before he left office. '269
Sound principles of government ethics hold that public representa-
tives should be prohibited from engaging in outside employment that
conflicts with official duties. 270 Legislators should not be permitted to
266 Compare People v. Moore, 85 Misc. 2d 4 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (finding an ethics rule
that barred receipt of gifts by a public official "under circumstances in which it could reasona-
bly be inferred that the gift was intended to influence him, or could reasonably be expected to
influence him .... or was intended as a reward" was unconstitutionally vague), with Merrin v.
Town of Kirkwood, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 878, 881 (App. Div. 1975) (upholding disciplinary action
under a similar rule).
267 Jeni L. Lassell, Comment, The Revolving Door: Should Oregon Restrict Former Leg-
islatorsfrom Becoming Lobbyists?, 82 OR. L. REV. 979, 979 (2003).
268 Id. at 979-80.
269 Id. at 980.
270 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(10) (2006) (providing that federal executive branch em-
ployees "shall not engage in outside employment or activities, including seeking or negotiating
for employment, that conflict with official Government duties and responsibilities"); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.29, § 5806(b)(l)-(4) (2003) (providing that no state officer or employee "shall
accept other employment .... which .... may result in ... (1) Impairment of independence of
judgment in the exercise of official duties; (2) An undertaking to give preferential treatment to
any person; (3) The making of a governmental decision outside official channels; or (4) Any
adverse effect on the confidence of the public in the integrity of the government"); CODE OF
ETHICS OF THE CrrI OF SAN AN'rONIO § 2-48 (barring "concurrent outside employment which
could reasonably be expected to impair independence of judgment in, or faithful performance
of, official duties"). See generally Johnson, America's Preoccupation, supra note 73, at 738
(discussing conflicting outside employment). Some codes restrict and discourage legislators
from working as lobbyists at other levels of government. See e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-67(h) (prohibiting members of the city council from lobbying the
Texas legislature when a session is pending or impending and stating that "[a]t any other time,
the City of San Antonio strongly discourages members of the City Council and their spouses,
agents and employees from lobbying before the Texas Legislature"); see also id. at § 2-67(g)
(prohibiting members of the Texas Legislature from lobbying the city council when a session
of the legislature is pending or impending and stating that "[alt any other time, the City of San
Antonio strongly discourages members of the Texas Legislature and their spouses, agents and
employees from lobbying before the City of San Antonio"). These provisions were passed
because a "part-time state legislator acting as a lobbyist before the city" tried to use "the
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work simultaneously for a lobbyist if the interests of the lobbyist's cli-
ents could be affected by the official actions of the legislator. Yet, some
states fail to prohibit such arrangements. Colorado merely requires the
legislator to file a statement disclosing the employment and the amount
being paid.271 Kentucky expressly allows a legislator's spouse to work
for a lobbyist, although usually not in a lobbying capacity. 272 Other states
have enacted conditional bans which address problems created by simul-
taneous outside employment. In Kansas, "[n]o lobbyist shall offer em-
ployment or employ any state officer or employee or associated person
thereof for a representation case, with intent to obtain improper influence
over a state agency. '273 In Iowa, House and Senate rules prohibit lobby-
ists "from offering economic or investment opportunit[ies] or promise[s]
of employment to Senators and Representatives with intent to influence
the performance of the legislator's duties. '274 City ethics codes com-
monly contain provisions requiring public servants to recuse themselves
from participation in any official action that affects the economic inter-
ests of the outside employer.275
7. Reciprocal Favors
Basic principles of good government suggest that official power
should not be used to unfairly advance or impede private interests. 276
prestige of his state office for the benefit of private interests." Johnson, Virtues and Limits of
Codes, supra note 102, at 42.
271 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-306 (2005) ("If any person who engages in lobbying em-
ploys or causes his employer to employ any member of the general assembly, any member of a
rule-making board or commission, any rule-making official of a state agency, any employee of
the general assembly, or any full-time state employee who remains in the partial employ of the
state or any agency thereof, the new employer shall file a statement .... The statement shall
specify the nature of the employment, the name of the individual to be paid thereunder, and the
amount of pay or consideration to be paid thereunder.").
272 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(2) (West 2004) ("Nothing in this code shall preclude
•.. [a] legislator's spouse from being employed in some other capacity than a legislative agent
[lobbyist] by the employer of a legislative agent.").
273 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-273(a) (2000) (emphasis added). "'Representation case' means
the representation of any person... with compensation, in any matter before any state agency
. . . [involving] the exercise of substantial discretion." Id. at § 46-226. Kansas law further
provides that "[n]o lobbyist shall offer employment or employ any state officer or employee or
associated person to use or attempt to use threat or promise of official action in an attempt to
influence a state agency in any representation case." Id. at § 46-273(b) (emphasis added).
274 LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 17.32 (emphasis
added).
275 See CODE OF ErHics OF THE CrrY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(5) (stating that a city
official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the economic interests of "the
outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child ... , spouse, or [a]
member of the household").
276 Johnson, Ethics in Government, supra note 69, at 732-34 (discussing unfair advance-
ment of private interests).
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That rule is sometimes expressly set out in city or state ethics codes.277
These codes provide that a public servant shall "not enter into an agree-
ment or understanding with any other person that official action by the
official or employee will be rewarded or reciprocated by the other per-
son, directly or indirectly. '278 In addition, municipal ethics codes 279 and
other laws 280 often state that a public official or employee shall not take
official action that supports the economic interests of a person with
whom that official or employee is negotiating to secure subsequent em-
ployment. These are sound principles upon which to base the conduct of
public affairs. Presumably, they should apply even when-or perhaps
especially when-the reciprocal favor would be traded with a lobbyist,
or when the subsequent employment would be arranged by a lobbyist.
Nevertheless, startling departures from these sound principles
abound. In one recent case, a member of the United States Senate was
criticized for regularly meeting with lobbyists at the Capitol. At the end
of these meetings, a national political committee would distribute "lists
of Washington-based lobbying job-openings and [discuss] which . . .
congressional aides and former lawmakers [were] best suited for those
jobs. '281 Even though the Senator in question stated publicly that, "he
would end his regular meetings," he merely moved them to a location
away from the Capitol, "at the same time and on the same day of the
week."
2 8 2
277 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b) ("A city official or em-
ployee may not use his or her official position to unfairly advance or impede private interests,
or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure, for any person (including himself or her-
self) any form of special consideration, treatment, exemption, or advantage beyond that which
is lawfully available to other persons."). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5806(b)(2) (2003)
(providing that no state officer or employee "shall accept ... (2) An undertaking to give
preferential treatment to any person").
278 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-44(b)(2) (prohibiting reciprocal
favors); see also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-4(b)(3) (2006) (stating a similar prohi-
bition). Such provisions may be idealistic in the sense that "[rieciprocity is one of the strongest
embedded norms in public life." Thurber, supra note 12, at 153. But that does not mean that
such laws are ill-advised principles for the conduct of government.
279 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43 ("[A] city official or
employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is likely to affect the economic
interests of ... a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve months ... the
official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly has ... solicited an offer of
employment for which the application is still pending .... received an offer of employment
which has not been rejected, or ... accepted an offer of employment.").
280 At the federal level, executive branch and congressional employees must normally
recuse themselves from matters affecting "any person or organization with whom ... [they
are] negotiating or . . . [have] any arrangement concerning prospective employment." 18
U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
281 Id.
282 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Charles Babington, Senator Resumes Lobbyist Huddles;
Santorum Suspended Sessions, WASH. POST., Mar. 9, 2006, at A4.
2006]
44 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
8. Lobbying by Closely Related Persons
There is an obvious appearance of impropriety when a public ser-
vant is lobbied by a close family member, who is acting on behalf of a
third party.2 83 In such circumstances, it appears to observers that the fam-
ily member is selling access to the public servant. This harms public
confidence in government almost as much as if the public official per-
sonally charged petitioners for the privilege of being heard.
Harm to confidence in government can also occur when an elected
representative dates a lobbyist who is representing private clients on mat-
ters for which the representative has official responsibility. This problem
is not new. Members of "the gentle sex" were employed as lobbyists in
the late 1880s with instructions to win the votes of congressmen, or at
least "keep them away from the House when the ... [bills were] voted
upon."2 84 More recently, one member of Congress "tried to insert lan-
guage into the Homeland Security Act to help Philip Morris tobacco
while dating the company's lobbyist. '285
Some lobbying firms also "openly hire the friends of a particular
member in order to get the legislator's ear."'286 At times in American
history, the "widows or daughters of former congressmen" have been
employed to exert their influence with designated congressmen. 287 In ad-
dition, legislative staff members often move on to lobbying firms after
leaving the public sector.288 These problems relating to privileged access
are sometimes susceptible to legal solutions. A rule banning lobbying by
"friends" would be unenforceably vague and unworkable. However, pro-
visions prohibiting lobbying by relatives or former staffers could be writ-
ten in sufficiently specific terms that would pass constitutional muster.
Although Congress has not addressed these problems, 289 some
states prevent persons closely connected to public servants from being
283 See Rudoren & Pilhofer, supra rote 51, at 14 (discussing how employing a lobbying
firm where the daughter of a transportation committee member was an associate resulted in a
meeting "the next day"); see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Panel Endorses More Information on
Lobbyist Contacts, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006 [hereinafter Birnbaum, Panel Endorses] (dis-
cussing a proposed law approved by the Senate Rules Committee that would "bar the relatives
of any senator from lobbying that senator's staff'); GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at
694-95 ("Linda Daschle, the wife of Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle .... [who] lobbied
successfully for clients in transportation-related industries in the late 1990s ... took a personal
oath to avoid lobbying the Senate when she became a lobbyist in 1997.").
284 REMINI, supra note 56, at 239.
285 Mills, supra note 191.
286 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 697.
287 REMINI, supra note 56, at 239.
288 See Mclntire, supra note 199 (noting that ten of the House majority leader's "former
staff members have gone to work for lobbying firms, and his former chief of staff ... is
married to a lobbyist").
289 See Ethics Fencing in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A14 (opining that in
discussing reform of the ethics rules relating to lobbyists, "Senators ducked a worthy amend-
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used by lobbyists to gain an unfair advantage in petitioning the govern-
ment. Arizona prohibits all persons from "improperly seek[ing] to
influence the vote of any member of the legislature through communica-
tion with that member's employer. '290  Other states have similar
provisions. 29'
Some municipalities have also enacted rules providing that a city
official or employee must refrain from official action affecting the eco-
nomic interests of "his or her parent, child, spouse, or other [close] fam-
ily member. ' 292 These rules apply where the economic interest being
advanced is that of "the outside employer of the official['s] . . . parent,
child . . ., spouse, or [a] member of the household. '29 3 These provisions
presumably require the public servant to recuse himself or herself from
participation in any matter that would economically benefit in a special
way294 a client of a family member-lobbyist or a client of the lobbying
firm that employs the family member.
9. Lobbyists as Campaign Treasurers, Consultants, and Staff
A variety of cozy relationships between lobbyists and candidates or
officeholders have become prevalent in recent years. In some cases, can-
didates sometimes select lobbyists to serve as campaign treasurers 295 or
in other campaign positions.296 These relationships send the message that
advancing a client's interests depends more upon campaign money than
upon the merits of the matter in question.297 Quite sensibly, some states
bar lobbyists from serving in a fundraising capacity.298 The rationale un-
ment that would bar members from putting family members on campaign payrolls, or see kin
become lobbyists").
290 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233(3) (2004).
291 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-302 (2005) (prohibiting persons from seeking influence
"through communication with the legislator's employer").
292 SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a)(2)
(2006).
293 Id. at § 2-43(a)(5).
294 Id. at § 2-43(c)(1) ("An action is likely to affect an economic interest if it is likely to
have an effect on that interest that is distinguishable from its effect on members of the public
in general or a substantial segment thereof.").
295 See Stephen Koff, Outrage Over Abramoff Case Belies Lobbyists' Place in Politics,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 22, 2006, at A20 (discussing lobbyists hired as campaign treasur-
ers), available at 2006 WLNR 1216376 (Westlaw).
296 See Mclntire, supra note 199 (stating that the House majority leader's "campaign
committees recently hired two people from lobbying groups for the financial and insurance
industries").
297 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (quoting an unnamed Texas lobbyist as stat-
ing that "[t]he system has changed in the last few years.... [Issues] matter less now than ever
before because ... a small group of clients with a tremendous amount of money control the
system").
298 The Alaska statute, for example, provides that a lobbyist may not:
serve as a campaign manager or director, serve as a campaign treasurer or deputy
campaign treasurer on a finance or fund-raising committee, host a fund-raising
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derlying these regulations is a desire to counteract the threat that fun-
draising lobbyists will crowd other voices out of the debate. Moreover,
lobbyists are supposed to aid the legislative process by bringing "infor-
mation to law makers, who often have small staffs that are young and
insufficiently paid. ' 299 Where the focus is predominantly on fundraising,
cogent arguments about the merits become less important.3°° This is also
true where the fundraising involves not the public official's campaign,
but charities and other private institutions favored by the official. Some
states expressly prohibit lobbyists from engaging "in any charitable fund-
raising activity at the request of an official or employee. '301 Other states
have more flexible rules. For example, Kentucky allows legislators and
candidates to solicit contributions "on behalf of charitable, civic, or edu-
cational entities provided the solicitations are broad-based and are not
directed solely or primarily at legislative agents [i.e., lobbyists]. ' 302
Some lobbying groups also provide campaign "consultants" to can-
didates. Those consultants can ultimately play a "key part in access and
lobbying battles after candidates become elected public officials." 30 3 For
this reason, it becomes "hard to tell where lobbying end[s] and public
service beg[ins]. ' '3°4 Astute observers of government rightfully ask
whether it is "ethical to have reciprocal relationships among consultants,
event, directly or indirectly collect contributions for, or deliver contributions to, a
candidate, or otherwise engage in the fund-raising activity of a legislative campaign
or campaign for governor or lieutenant governor...; this paragraph does not apply
to a representational lobbyist as defined in the regulations of the Alaska Public Of-
fices Commission, and does not prohibit a lobbyist from making personal contribu-
tions to a candidate ... or personally advocating on behalf of a candidate.
ALASKA STAT. § 24-45.121(a)(8) (2004). Under the referenced regulations,
"'[r]epresentational lobbyist' means that the individual is not employed by the person or group
on whose behalf he is lobbying and receives no salary, fee, retainer, or any economic consider-
ation whatsoever, other than reimbursement of travel and personal living expenses, for his
services as a lobbyist." Ak. Pub. Offices Comm'n, Reg. 2 AAC 50.511 (2006). See also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 25-4144 (2000) ("No person who is registered as a lobbyist.., shall be eligible
for appointment as treasurer for any candidate or candidate committee."); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 6.811(5) (West 2004) ("A legislative agent [lobbyist] shall not serve as a campaign treasurer,
or as a fundraiser... [of more than $3,000 in a jurisdiction with more than 200,000 people] for
a candidate or legislator."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-8. 1(A) (LexisNexis 2004) ("No lobbyist
may serve as a campaign chairman, treasurer or fundraising chairman for a candidate for the
legislature or a statewide office.").
299 See Scharrer, supra note 43 (discussing Texas).
300 Guy Taylor, Lobbying Scandal Heightens Scrutiny, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at A l
(quoting a Georgetown University professor as stating that the "fixation on campaign funds,
dramatically has changed the tenor on Capitol Hill; . . . I had a corporate lobbyist tell me
recently that his job wasn't much fun anymore ... that he didn't feel that he needed to muster
complicated arguments, just round up contributions for the majority").
301 MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 15-713(10) (LexisNexis 2004) ("including soliciting,
transmitting the solicitation of, or transmitting a charitable contribution").
302 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.626(1) (emphasis added).
303 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 15 1.
304 Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing lobbying in Washington, D.C.).
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lobbyists, and public officials [where] those alliances are not transparent
and . . . seem to go against the public interest.
30 5
In certain cases, officeholders select lobbyists to serve as a chief of
staff30 6 or in other trusted positions.30 7 These arrangements allow offi-
cials to take advantage of "having an unpaid lobbyist in the back room
where the decisions . . . [are] being made."'308 In some states there are
laws prohibiting lobbyists from serving "as . . . member[s] of a state
board or commission, if the lobbyist's employer may receive direct eco-
nomic benefit from a decision of that board or commission. ' 30 9 Although
these laws are not violated in cases of executive and legislative staff ap-
pointments, the ethical lesson is clear. The interests of good government
are best served when there is some distance between lobbyists and the
exercise of official power.
One way to address these types of problems is to bar elected offi-
cials from voting on issues involving lobbyists who served as campaign
consultants. Good ethics codes normally preclude public officials or em-
ployees from taking official action that would economically benefit
themselves or any closely connected person or entity.3 10 A campaign
305 See Thurber, supra note 12, at 154.
306 See Scharrer, supra note 43, at 10A (stating that the governor of Texas hired as his
chief of staff a man who had lobbied for the tobacco industry and who subsequently "returned
to his lucrative lobbying business").
307 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 (discussing a Texas lobbyist who was tapped
by the state House speaker to join his "transition team" thus becoming "in essence a govern-
ment insider for a few months, while keeping his day job representing big money clients");
Revolting Door, supra note 209 (discussing a lobbyist who was appointed as the Interior De-
partment's secretary and then left public service to return to the private sector as a lobbyist).
308 Scharrer, supra note 43.
309 ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(7) (2004); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105-967 (West
2006) (prohibiting lobbyists from serving on certain commissions).
310 For example, San Antonio's code of ethics provides:
(a) General Rule. To avoid the appearance and risk of impropriety, a city official or
employee shall not take any official action that he or she knows is likely to affect the
economic interests of:
(1) the official or employee;
(2) his or her parent, child, spouse, or other family member within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity;
(3) his or her outside client;
(4) a member of his or her household;
(5) the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child
.... spouse, or member of the household ... ;
(6) a business entity in which the official or employee knows that any of the
persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic interest ... ;
(7) a business entity which the official or employee knows is an affiliated business
or partner of a business entity in which any of the persons listed in Subsections
(a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic interest as defined in Section 2-42;
(8) a business entity or nonprofit entity for which the city official or employee
serves as an officer or director or in any other policy making position; or
(9) a person or business entity with whom, within the past twelve months:
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consultant who is or becomes a lobbyist is connected to a public official
by a relationship so important in nature that the public interest would be
best served by requiring the official or employee to step aside and allow
others to act on the matter in question.31' The City and County of San
Francisco currently prohibit campaign consultants from communicating
with officers of the city and county who are their current or previous
clients. 3 12
10. Make-Work Legislative Proposals
Many states prohibit lobbyists from introducing legislation solely
for the purpose of securing future employment either to ensure the law's
passage or defeat. 313 Such limitations share a common objective with
ethics rules 314 and other laws 315 that prohibit attorneys and their clients
from engaging in frivolous litigation. The goal in both of these contexts
is to avoid wasting valuable public and private resources on initiatives
that do not further legitimate purposes.
(A) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly has
(i) solicited an offer of employment for which the application is still pending,
(ii) received an offer of employment which has not been rejected, or
(iii) accepted an offer of employment; or
(3) the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly engaged
in negotiations pertaining to business opportunities, where such negotiations are
pending or not terminated.
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(a) (2006). See
also DALLAS, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 12A-3 (2006) (stating a similar rule).
31 1 To be effective, recusal must be carefully choreographed. See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS
OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-43(b) (providing that a city official or employee with a
conflict of interest "shall: (1) immediately refrain from further participation in the matter,
including discussions with any persons likely to consider the matter; and (2) promptly file with
the City Clerk the appropriate form for disclosing the nature and extent of the prohibited
conduct" and in addition "(3) a supervised employee shall promptly bring the conflict to the
attention of his or her supervisor, who will then, if necessary, reassign responsibility for han-
dling the matter to another person; and (4) a member of a board shall promptly disclose the
conflict to other members of the board and shall not be present during the board's discussion
of, or voting on, the matter").
312 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE § 2.117
(2006) (providing, with certain exceptions, that "[n]o campaign consultant, individual who has
an ownership interest in the campaign consultant, or an employee of the campaign consultant
shall communicate with any officer of the City and County who is a current or former client of
the campaign consultant on behalf of another person or entity (other than the City and County)
in exchange for economic consideration for the purpose of influencing local legislative or
administrative action").
313 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.121(a)(4).
314 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (stating in part that a "lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous").
315 FED. R. Civ. PROC. 11 (2006) (requiring certification that a claim "is not being
presented ... to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" and is
"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument," and allowing sanctions against
"the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated" the rule.).
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B. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Lobbyist rules typically rely heavily on disclosure. The federal
Lobbyist Disclosure Act,3 16 for example, requires lobbyists to register 317
and file periodic activity reports. 318 Disclosure regimes endeavor to ex-
pose to public scrutiny the identity of persons seeking to influence offi-
cial decisions and how much money is being spent on their efforts. 319
At the state level, the scope of lobbyist disclosure obligations varies
widely. 320 State laws may require disclosure of "fees paid to lobbyists,
matters lobbied, the names of employees or contractors [who do the]
lobbying, the total amount spent on lobbying, [and the nature of] gifts
made to public officials .... ,,321 Some cities have adopted similar regis-
tration and disclosure regimes. 322 However, many cities have no such
requirements.
Lobbying that occurs in the open is less objectionable than lobbying
that occurs behind closed doors. Statements made in public by lobbyists
can be scrutinized by others and challenged with competing facts and
arguments. The resulting public debate is consistent with a healthy politi-
cal process. In contrast, statements made by lobbyists that are hidden
from public view cannot easily be probed or disputed. Consequently, in-
accurate assertions may go uncontested. Lobbyist disclosure require-
ments reflect these concerns. As a result, statements made by lobbyists at
public meetings, 323 in publicly-available documents, 324 or through mass
media325 are typically exempted from the definition of what constitutes
lobbying. Such activities, as well as expenditures or income related
thereto, normally do not need to be revealed.
316 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (2006).
317 Id. at § 1603 (detailing the registration process).
318 Id. at § 1604 (requiring semi-annual reports).
319 Cf. GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 692 (stating that the standard approach to
regulating lobbyists at the federal level has been to "'monitor lobbyists' activities and reveal
them publicly when they go too far").
320 See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 667-68 (stating that "the amount and method of
disclosure varies widely state-to-state" and summarizing state registration and reporting
requirements).
321 See id. at 668.
322 See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO §§ 2-62
to 2-71 (2006).
323 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B)(vii) (2006) (exempting from the definition of "lobby-
ing contact," "testimony given before a committee, subcommittee, or task force of the Con-
gress, or submitted for inclusion in the public record of a hearing conducted by such
committee, subcommittee, or task force").
324 See, e.g., id. at §§ 1602(8)(B)(xiv)-(xv) (exempting from the definition of "lobbying
contact" a communication that is "a written comment filed in the course of a public proceeding
or any other communication that is made on the record in a public proceeding" or "a petition
for agency action made in writing and required to be a matter of public record").
325 See, e.g., id. at § 1602(8)(B)(iii) (discussing communications made "through radio,
television, cable television, or other medium of mass communication").
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The expenditure of large amounts of money on lobbying poses risks
to good government. Beyond a certain point, expenditures suggest an
effort to overwhelm the facts through excessive spending. 326 Some lob-
byist rules address this problem through disclosure regimes that come
into effect when client expenditures or lobbyist income on particular
public issues reach a certain level. 327 In other words, once the issues and
expenditures have been linked, the public can scrutinize the decisions
made by public servants and, if necessary, hold those actors accountable.
In spite of the apparent simplicity of this concept, it is difficult to imple-
ment effectively for reasons related to regulatory complexity328 and
timely dissemination of information. 329
1. Regulatory Complexity
Lobbyist disclosure regimes are necessarily complex due to the
multiple ways money is used to influence the resolution of public is-
sues.330 Some persons make expenditures directly without hiring some-
one to act on their behalf. Other persons are represented by lobbyists
326 Cf. Still a Bad Deal, supra note 70 (discussing how an "army of lobbyists" ensured
that the House approved a deal with India "with minimal restrictions").
327 From one perspective, identifying the issue-the purpose of the lobbying-should not
be difficult. Lobbyists are admonished to "[d]efine the issues in a lobbying visit. Determine at
the outset what you want." See WOLFE & LEVINE, supra note 43, at 20. "Definition is crucial
because of the relatively narrow temporal focus of legislators and their staff." Id. Yet, on
another level, issue definition may be far less certain. A city ethics code may define lobbying
as efforts to influence the resolution of a "municipal question." See CODE OF ETmICS OF THE
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(h) (defining "lobbying"). "Municipal question" may itself be
defined, but that definition may be less than fully satisfactory. See id. at § 2-620) (stating, in
part, that "[t]he term 'municipal question' does not include the day-to-day application, admin-
istration, or execution of existing city programs, policies, ordinances, resolutions, or practices,
including matters that may be approved administratively without consideration by a board, a
commission, or the City Council"). If a lobbyist represents a developer in seeking a variance of
the tree-preservation ordinance on property zoned for commercial use, is that activity "lobby-
ing," and if so, is the issue that must be disclosed on the lobbyist registration and activity
reports "variance," "zoning," "tree ordinance," or something else? If multiple lobbyists re-
present multiple clients with respect to the same or similar matters, it is possible the issue will
be identified differently in the various filings, and that it will be difficult or impossible for
persons scrutinizing those filings to determine how much money was spent by various clients
to influence those issues. Presumably, issue identification by legislative lobbyists can be sim-
plified by reference to bill numbers, but those references do not apply to non-legislative lobby-
ing or legislative lobbying where a bill has yet to be drafted.
328 See discussion infra subpart III.B. 1.
329 See discussion infra subpart III.B.2.
330 Horn, supra note 3, at 51 (discussing lobbying by the "small to modestly sized non-
profit organization"). Horn says there are three basic approaches: first, "hiring one or more
staff members . .. [to run] the group's legislative or political operation"; second, simply retain-
ing a lobbyist when the need for legislative action arises; and third, joining a "coalition of
similarly situated or interested entities" that hire full-time staff or retains lobbying profession-
als. Id. at 51.
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who are in-house staff members. 33' Still other persons engage outside
lobbyists, who either work alone, in small boutiques, or as part of larger
firms (such as law firms) which devote all or part of their time to lobby-
ing.332 Any effective regulatory regime must take account of all of these
types of lobbying. On the one hand, regulators must exercise care not to
omit relevant lobbying approaches from the registration and reporting
regime. To the extent that any such omissions could become "loopholes"
for lobbyists to exploit, they could bring the entire disclosure regime into
disrepute.333 On the other hand, a regime that imposes strict requirements
may trigger an excessive amount of disclosure which, because of its
abundance or possible inconsistency, will obscure, rather than reveal im-
portant information. To avoid both pitfalls, a properly drafted disclosure
regime should embrace an interlocking set of obligations and exemp-
tions334 to ensure that the disclosures required are not overly burden-
some, yet capture all relevant information. Not surprisingly, the
challenge of defining who should register and disclose information is
more complex than might first appear. 335
Similar difficulties arise with respect to defining what type of con-
duct constitutes "lobbying. '336 Disclosure laws typically incorporate in-
tricate formulations that exclude from the definition of "lobbying" the
331 See Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 ("Most [lobbyists] work in house for a single
interest, like a corporation or a trade association. A smaller number of hired guns hang a
shingle outside an office and work for whoever hires them. Some work alone, others in infor-
mal or formal partnerships.").
332 See Chwat, supra note 41, at 115-17 (discussing various types of lobbying firms,
including "one-stop shops," "boutique" firms, and law firms).
333 See Johnson, Virtues and Limits of Codes, supra note 102, at 41 ("As far as a regula-
tory document is concerned, no criticism so discredits its content as the charge that the docu-
ment contains 'loopholes.' Such allegations ... call into question not merely the substance of
the enactment, but the competence of the drafters and the value of the project at all.").
334 See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(g)
(2006) (granting an exemption from the registration and periodic filing requirements to "[an
agent or employee of a lobbying firm or other registrant that files a registration statement or
activity report for the period in question fully disclosing all relevant information").
335 See generally San Jose, Cal., San Josd Municipal Code §12.12.190 (2006) (defining
"contract" lobbyists, "in-house" lobbyists, and "expenditure" lobbyists).
336 Id. at § 12.12.80 ("'Lobbying' means influencing or attempting to influence a city
official or city official-elect with regard to a legislative or administrative action of the city or
redevelopment agency . . . . "Influencing" means the purposeful communication, either di-
rectly or through agents, for the purpose of promoting, supporting, modifying, opposing, caus-
ing the delay or abandonment of conduct, or otherwise intentionally affecting the official
actions of a city official or city official-elect, by any means, including, but not limited to
providing or using persuasion, information, incentives, statistics, studies or analyses.").
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activities of media outlets, 337 churches,338 whistle blowers, 339 persons re-
sponding to agency requests for public comment, 340 individuals seeking
to resolve problems related to government benefits, employment, or per-
sonal matters, 34' certain governmental entities, 342 and others.343 In addi-
tion to direct contacts with government officials or employees, 344
disclosure laws regulate indirect or "grassroots" lobbying. 345
Problems also arise with regard to the definition of "expenditures."
For example, a law may be insufficiently specific in identifying which
expenditures must be reported. The federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
of 1946:
left it up to each group or its lobbyists to determine what
portion of total expenditures to report. As a result, some
organizations whose Washington office budgets ran into
the millions of dollars reported spending only very small
amounts on lobbying, contending that the remainder was
spent on research, general public information, and other
matters. 34
6
Disclosure regimes that seek to trace the influence of money often
require disclosure of lobbyist compensation in order to measure the total
amount spent on a lobbying effort.347 However, such provisions may be
difficult or impossible to enact because legislative bodies may be reluc-
tant to require disclosure of lobbyists' income. As a result, a well-crafted
reform proposal may be gutted by an amendment 348 that strips a pro-
337 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(b)(ii) (2006) (providing that the term "lobbying contact"
does not include communications "made by a representative of a media organization if the
purpose of the communication is gathering and disseminating news and information to the
public).
338 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xviii) (discussing tax exempt entities and religious entities).
339 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvii) (discussing whistle blowers).
340 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(x) (discussing notices published in the Federal Register and
other publications).
341 See, e.g., id. § 1602(8)(b)(xvi) (discussing matters "involving only that individual").
342 See, e.g., San Antonio, Tex., Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(c)
(2006) ("provided the communications relate solely to subjects of governmental interest").
343 See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 665 (exemptions for bona fide salespersons
may apply to limitations on "procurement lobbying").
344 See Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 666 ("All lobby laws capture 'direct contacts' with
officials or employees.")
345 Id. But see Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-64(b) (exempting non-profit
entities seeking to mobilize constituents).
346 GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718.
347 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(3) (2006) (requiring "a good faith estimate of the total
amount of all income from the client"). Cf. Code of Ethics of the City of San Antonio § 2-
62(c) (defining compensation).
348 See Stephanie D. Campanella et al., supra note 226, at 139 (discussing an amendment
"deleting the section of ... [a Georgia ethics] bill that would have required the disclosure of
lobbyists' income").
[Vol. 16:1
REGULATING LOBBYISTS
posed law of the ability to link dollars to issues. Other regulations im-
pose a duty to register and disclose only after a certain amount is spent
on lobbying. 349 Ideally, that threshold should enable regulators to focus
on the "major players," and to avoid ensnaring unwitting citizens. How-
ever, opponents of reform efforts may seek to muddy the waters by low-
ering the threshold so that the law generates a great deal of useless
information that will make it more burdensome for government watch-
dogs to track the conduct of those who should be scrutinized.350
In addition, it is necessary to anticipate when dollars will be counted
to determine whether the registration threshold has been passed. If a lob-
byist is compensated with an hourly fee, but the money will not be paid
until two years have elapsed, when is compensation actually received?
Codes sometimes deal with this problem by providing that
"[c]ompensation which has not yet been received is considered to be re-
ceived on the date that it is earned, if that date is ascertainable; other-
wise, it is received on the date on which the contract . . . is made, or on
the date lobbying commences, whichever is first. ' 351 Similarly, if a client
offers to pay a lobbyist (a) $10 for pleading the client's case to members
of the city council and (b) $10,000 for cutting the client's lawn, which
amounts should be counted toward determining whether the threshold
has been surpassed? One possible solution is "[i]f a lobbyist engages in
both lobbying activities and other activities. .. , compensation for lobby-
ing includes all amounts received . . ., if, for the purpose of evading the
349 Under federal law, a lobbyist need not register with respect to a client if income from
the client does not exceed $5,000 or total expenditures on lobbying do not exceed $20,000. 2
U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(A) (2006).
350 When the City of San Antonio, Texas, passed a new ethics code in November, 1998, a
person who engaged in lobbying (broadly defined) was required to register only if "(a) with
respect to any client, the person engage[d] in lobbying activities for compensation of more
than one thousand dollars ($1000) in a calendar quarter; or (b) the person expend[ed] more
than one thousand dollars ($1000) for lobbying in a calendar quarter." An agitated citizen who
buys two tickets to a $250-a-plate dinner for the opportunity to button-hole the mayor about a
particular municipal issue would not be required to register. Subsequent to 1998, the San
Antonio ethics code was amended so that it now provides that "a person . . . who engages in
lobbying must register ... if: (a) with respect to any client, the person or entity engages in
lobbying activities for compensation; or (b) the person or entity expends monies for lobbying
activities." SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-63 (2006).
The elimination of the $1000 threshold has numerous untoward consequences. The hypotheti-
cal citizen who goes to the dinner to talk to the mayor has inadvertently violated the ethics
codes-which will anger and embarrass the citizen, and bring the code into disrepute. The
amendment requires more filings from "small time" lobbyists and makes it harder to track the
major players. And the change may discourage persons who are aware of the sweep of the new
rule from engaging in the type of civic involvement that no one would really be much con-
cerned about, and thereby protect the "turf' of big-time lobbyists.
351 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c). The federal law is framed in
terms of compensation or expenditures that are "expected." 2 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii)
(2006).
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.. . [rules], the lobbyist has structured the receipt of compensation in a
way that unreasonably minimizes the value of the lobbying activities." 352
2. The Limits of Sunshine
An ethics reporting regime makes little sense unless someone scruti-
nizes the content and truthfulness of the information that has been dis-
closed.353 On occasion, the media unearths stunning omissions,
discrepancies, and outright falsehoods in lobbyists' filings.354 However,
journalistic review of voluminous public documents is haphazard at best
given the limited resources of many newspapers and broadcasters, as
well as the distraction of other public events that command reporters'
attention. Moreover, while media outlets might scrutinize filings by lob-
byists at the federal and perhaps at the state level, at the local level, there
is often only one newspaper in the city. Aside from a paucity of staff
time to review tedious documents, there may be political and other pres-
sures that cause the sole newspaper in town to be less than aggressive in
reviewing lobbyists' filings.
Public interest groups also play a role in scrutinizing lobbyists' dis-
closures. Nonprofit organizations, such as the National Legal and Policy
Center, sometimes identify serious problems. 355 But again, when one
looks at the various levels of government nationally, the process of re-
view is hit-or-miss.
"The oversight of lobby and gift laws differs by state, ranging from
aggressive, independent agencies dedicated to enforcement and interpre-
tation of lobby and/or gift laws to jurisdictions with almost no enforce-
ment. '356 In Texas, "the state agency in charge of monitoring lobbyists
has received 1,500 sworn complaints since its founding in 1992 ... [but]
has never conducted a complete audit or subpoenaed a single document,
or subpoenaed and met with a witness in person. '357 At the federal
352 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO § 2-62(c).
353 Cf GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 718 (stating that under a former federal law
requiring reports by lobbyists "the Justice Department eventually adopted a policy of investi-
gating [falsity, which was a crime,] only when it received complaints .... [T]here were only
six prosecutions between 1946 and 1980").
354 Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[T]he right to
petition is subject to abuse and misuse and a vigilant press can expose abuses to public
view.").
355 See Editorial, No Ethics in Congress without Enforcement, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at 6B [hereinafter No Ethics] (discussing a complaint filed with the U.S.
attorney for the District of Columbia by the NLPC).
356 Nielsen, supra note 3, at 671.
357 Sandberg & Guckian, supra note 70 ("Since 1992, the [Texas Ethics Commission] has
initiated only one sworn complaint, has conducted one formal hearing and has not forwarded a
single case to a law enforcement agency for criminal prosecution.").
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level, 358 and in many states, independent enforcement of lobbyist laws
would be a great step forward. But legislators, not surprisingly, are reluc-
tant to fund such efforts. Montana addresses this concern by allowing
citizens to bring actions to enforce the lobbying rules if the attorney gen-
eral and other officials choose not to do so. 359
One of the chief objections to disclosure regimes is that the infor-
mation often comes too late. Lobbyists do not file reports daily, rather,
they typically file on a semi-annual or quarterly basis. 360 Thus, by the
time someone reviews the data, decisions have often been made about
the underlying issues and public debate has moved on to other subjects.
Oftentimes there is nothing more than a vague hope that when informa-
tion becomes public, busy citizens will learn things about the past and
remember to hold elected officials accountable at some point in the
future.
"An increasing number of states require (or permit) disclosure of
lobbying activity by electronic means. ' '361 Improvements in on-line fil-
ing 362 and searchable databases, coupled with ethics-in-government
358 See Editorial, Ethical Notes on the Reforming Class, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2006, at A14
(criticizing a Florida Congresswoman's "bumbling attempts" to explain away a $2,800 dinner
for two with a defense contractor, despite a "$50 limit on feeding a lawmaker," and opining
that "the real bottom line was that with no one enforcing ethical rules in the House-hey, bon
appdtit"); see also No Ethics, supra note 355 (discussing "why Congress can't police itself').
359 The Montana code provides:
Any individual who has notified the attorney general, the commissioner, and the
appropriate county attorney in writing that there is reason to believe that some por-
tion of this chapter is being violated may bring in the name of the state an action...
authorized under this chapter if: (i) the attorney general, the commissioner, or the
appropriate county attorney has failed to commence an action within 90 days after
notice; and (ii) the attorney general, the commissioner, or the county attorney fails to
commence an action within 10 days after receiving a written notice that a citizen's
action will be brought if the attorney general, the commissioner, or the county attor-
ney does not bring an action
MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-305(4) (2005). However, the incentives to bring a citizen's action are
slight. "If the individual who brings the citizen's action prevails, the individual is entitled to be
reimbursed by the state of Montana for costs and attorney fees incurred. However .... [if the]
action ... is dismissed and ... the court also finds [the case] was brought without reasonable
cause, the court may order the individual commencing the action to pay all costs of trial and
reasonable attorney fees incurred by the defendant." Id. at § 5-7-305(4)(c). In addition, "[all
civil penalties imposed pursuant to this section must be deposited in the state general fund." Id.
at § 5-7-305(6).
360 See Birnbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing proposed legislation that would
"require lobbyists to file quarterly rather than the current biannual reports about their activities
as well as a new, once-a-year disclosure that would detail their donations to federal candidates,
officeholders and political parties").
361 Nielsen et al., supra note 3, at 668.
362 See Bimbaum, Lobbyists, supra note 12 (discussing a proposed federal measure that
"would mandate much more extensive use of the Internet in filing the new and additional
disclosures"). See also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Online System for Disclosures Frustrates Lobby-
ists, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 (discussing glitches in an online filing system for lobbyists
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blogs, 363 might help to close the gap between information collection and
accountability. However, even then there will be reason to question
whether the disclosure of practices that are potentially harmful to the
public interest is the best the law can do to ensure good government. As
one editorial lamented, a law that requires disclosure of gifts and cam-
paign money, rather than banning them entirely, is the equivalent of post-
ing of "price lists for the cost of doing business" with law makers. 364
Another commentator remarked that, "disclosure laws have 'legitimized
a form of official corruption' [through publication]." 365
IV. THE FUTURE OF LOBBYIST REGULATIONS
There is no shortage of news stories identifying weaknesses in the
rules that regulate lobbyists. The interesting thing is that if one looks at
the law nationally, for virtually every issue that someone can identify,
some legislature, somewhere, has passed a rule that effectively addresses
the problem, or has taken action that would assist reformers in crafting
appropriate solutions. Thus, the challenge in regulating lobbyists is not to
re-conceptualize the field or to develop radically innovative solutions,
but to employ the tools that are already available.
In recent years, the dominant approach has been to embrace disclo-
sure and sunshine. While no one suggests abandoning that progress, there
are limits as to what can be achieved by regimes that seek to thrust
masses of information on a citizenry too busy, distracted, or simply una-
ble to utilize that information. In many respects, legal prohibitions that
directly address bad practices offer a more efficient, albeit sometimes
overlooked, 366 means for resolving problems related to lobbying. Ban-
ning harmful practices outright takes greater political resolve than requir-
ing disclosure. Yet, there is reason to think that with respect to lobbying,
progress can be made in the continuing -quest for ethics in government.
which was originally "hailed by lawmakers, lobbyists and government watchdog groups as a
boon to public disclosure" when it was adopted in 2005).
363 See Editorial, New Rules in Yonkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at WEI5 (discussing
an "acid-tongued" blogger seeking to expose "hidden outrages").
364 Editorial, Now You See It, Now You Don't, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006 at WK 13.
365 See Plemmons, supra note 6, at 155 n.148 (quoting former White House counsel John
Dean).
366 For example, "Maine has permissive lobbying regulations, with few explicit prohibi-
tions." LOBBYING, PACs, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE, supra note 3, at § 21.34. Similarly, in
Wyoming, "regulation of lobbyists consists of registration and limited financial disclosure ...
[and does not] describe specific prohibited practices." Id. at § 52.31.
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